Building on the new translation of Heidegger’s Introduction to Metaphysics (2000), this article presents Heidegger’s metaphysical discussion of Being, and I hope it will contribute to clarifying the foundation for the reinterpretation of traditional concepts of place, space, time, and matter that I am advocating for at RSaP-Rethinking Space and Place. This ground shares many intersecting threads with Heidegger’s concept of Being, as he elaborated in his 1935 lecture course at the University of Freiburg. This lecture formed the basis of the book An Introduction to Metaphysics, translated by Ralph Manheim and published in 1959, which was the first book-length work by Heidegger to be translated into English.[1]
I will follow the structure of Heidegger’s metaphysical discourse by summarizing the book’s most important passages, in which he attempted to recover the original sense of Being – a fundamental and powerful concept that, according to the philosopher, still influences and dominates our understanding of reality today. Where relevant to the context of this website, which reinterprets the concepts of space and place, I will provide my perspective to demonstrate the connection between Heidegger’s metaphysical discourse and the revised understanding of place and space, presented here. The bold and italic headlines introduce a summary of Heidegger’s arguments, specifying the chapter and section of the book, while my commentaries are introduced by bold headlines on a light-grey background.
To provide readers with a comprehensive understanding of the book and facilitate their comprehension of Heidegger’s argument development, Gregory Fried and Richard Polt, the translators of the 2000 edition of Introduction to Metaphysics, which I will be referencing, proposed an outline of the entire work, maintaining Heidegger’s original four-chapter structure and adding further divisions and subdivisions into sections. Chapter One is titled ‘The Fundamental Question of Metaphysics’ and is developed around the following themes: Section A. The why-question as the first of all questions; Section B. Philosophy as the asking of the why-question; Section C. Phusis: the fundamental Greek word for beings as such; Section D. The meaning of ‘introduction to metaphysics’; Section E. Unfolding the why-question by means of the question of Nothing; Section F. The prior question: How does it stand with Being? Chapter Two is a discussion ‘On the Grammar and Etymology of the Word “Being”’, which is also the title of the chapter. It is divided into the following sections: Section A. The superficiality of the science of linguistics; Section B. The grammar of ‘Being’; Section C. The etymology of ‘Being’; Section D. Summary. Chapter Three is about ‘The Question of the Essence of Being’, and is divided into three sections: Section A. The priority of Being over beings; Section B. The essential link between Being and the word; Section C. The inclusion of the various meanings of ‘is’ within the Greek understanding of Being as presence. The final Chapter Four is the most conspicuous and articulated as it explores the different approaches to understanding the concept of Being by comparing it to other fundamental notions that delimit the essence and the meaning of Being itself; accordingly, the chapter is titled ‘The Restriction of Being’. An introductory section, ‘Section A. Seven points of orientation for the investigation of the restriction of Being’, provides an overview of the directions Heidegger’s arguments will take; the subsequent sections then examine Being in relation to those characters that delimit its essence, that is: Section B. Being and becoming; Section C. Being and seeming; Section D. Being and thinking (which is particularly significant as ‘thinking’ provides the decisive limitation, or restriction, that shapes the current interpretation of Being); Section E. Being and the ought. A final section — Section F. Conclusion — presents a brief review of the arguments discussed.
Since my text, including resumes and commentaries, is quite lengthy, I have decided to divide it into two consecutive articles: this article — Being as Place: Introduction to Metaphysics – Part One — covers the arguments discussed in the first three chapters of Heidegger’s Introduction to Metaphysics, while Being as Place: Introduction to Metaphysics – Part Two (the Limitation of Being) covers the final chapter.
Let’s begin our inquiry into the nature of Being and beings, and explore how a reformed interpretation of place can serve as an alternative foundation to Heidegger’s metaphysical discourse on Being.[2]
Chapter One: The Fundamental Question of Metaphysics
Why are there beings at all instead of nothing?
Heidegger also refers to this question as ‘the why-question’ (Warumfrage), which is the fundamental question he poses at the beginning of his inquiry into the Being of beings – the metaphysical ground upon which everything else stands. As indicated by the translators of the 2000 edition of Introduction to Metaphysics, Gregory Fried and Richard Polt, a crucial clarification regarding the adopted terminology is necessary: in this context, the term ‘beings’ (in the plural form) denotes ‘what is’, or ‘that which is’, translating Heidegger’s original German expression ‘das Seiende (or the equivalent Seiendes)’, an expression ‘broad enough to refer to any entity, physical or otherwise, with which we may have dealings, whether real, illusory, or imagined.’[3] Later in the text, Heidegger provides examples of the special characteristics of the particular domains of beings, ranging from ‘the things that we can grasp with our hands right away’, like tools and vehicles, to ‘land, sea, mountains, rivers, forests, and the individual things in them: trees, birds and insects, grasses and stones’;[4] from mighty beings like the earth, the moon, or a planet, to people on the street, including ourselves, the Japanese, criminals, or the madmen in a madhouse; and from the cathedral of Strasbourg to Bach’s fugues and Hölderlin’s hymns.[5] All these entities are ‘beings’. In addition to referring to those specific beings, the term ‘das Seiende (or the equivalent Seiendes)’ also encompasses beings in general, that is, ‘beings as a whole and as such’, as in the question ‘Why are there beings [Seiendes] at all instead of nothing?’ While that which characterizes beings as beings in general, that is, their ‘beingness’, is expressed by the German term ‘Seiendheit’.[6] A small aside, here: in the original 1959 translation by Ralph Manheim, the recurrent term ‘beings’ to denote some particular being or beings (Seiendes) is rendered by the term ‘essents’.[7]
the term ‘beings’ – in the plural form – stands for ‘what is’, or ‘that which is’; it translates Heidegger’s originary German expression ‘das Seiende’ – an expression ‘broad enough to refer to any entity, physical or otherwise, with which we may have dealings, whether real, illusory, or imagined.’
After exploring the gradient of meanings associated with the term ‘beings’, ranging from particular to universal, we arrive at the term ‘Being’, which represents the most universal characteristic of beings, or, as I would put it, the processuality (in the sense of event) that underlies them. As the translators explain in their introduction, the term ‘Being’, – which they capitalize to distinguish it from ‘beings’ (a convention I will follow) – is the translation of the German ‘das Sein’, literally meaning ‘the to be’;[8] to grasp the meaning of ‘Being’, we should not interpret it as mere ‘beingness’, but rather as an inquiry ‘into the happening, the event, in which all beings become accessible and understandable to us as beings.’[9] According to Heidegger, ‘much of the history of philosophy has focused on this beingness rather than inquiring into the happening of Being itself.’[10] So, in this sense, Being is the constant presence concealed by beings, the ultimate ground for beings, and Heidegger’s discourse aims to uncover the veils behind which Being is concealed, exploring the different phases through which its unconcealment is attained.
the term ‘Being’ – in the capitalized form – is the translation of the German ‘das Sein’, literally meaning ‘the to be’ … we should understand the question of Being as an inquiry ‘into the happening, the event, in which all beings become accessible and understandable to us as beings.’
Chapter One — Section A. ‘The why-question as the first of all questions’
For Heidegger, the question of why there are beings at all instead of nothing is central. It lies at the ground of any other possible and imaginable question. This question is ‘the broadest in scope’, embracing everything that is (exists), with its domain limited only by what is not (does not exist), that is, by Nothing. Moreover, this is ‘the deepest’ question, as we seek to uncover the fundamental basis of all existence, the ultimate limit, and thus strive for depth by moving beyond the superficial. Finally, it is ‘the most originary’ since our interest shifts to beings in general, rather than focusing on a particular individual or even the human being: ‘we are not interrogating this being or that being, nor all beings, each in turn; instead, we are asking from the start the whole of what is, or as we say for reasons to be discussed later: beings as a whole and as such’.[11]
we are not interrogating this being or that being, nor all beings, each in turn; instead, we are asking from the start the whole of what is, or … beings as a whole and as such
This ‘whole of what is’, these ‘beings as a whole and as such’, this universal character of beings understood as an unfolding event that progresses through various phases and without which no beings could exist, can be summed up in a single word: Being. Then, contrary to what a literal reading of the why-question might suggest, Heidegger argues that our primary interest lies not in specific entities or beings, but rather in the fundamental ground of beings as beings, which is Being. Heidegger explicitly rejects a narrow interpretation of Being (as mere ‘beingness’), instead emphasizing the importance of investigating it through different historical phases as a methodological endeavour, rather than seeking a definition. His repeated questioning the why-question time and again, in different parts of the discourse, is an indication in that sense: ‘this questioning in itself is … a distinctive occurrence that we call a happening’.[12] This is a hallmark of Heidegger’s style, characterized by continuous interrogation of the same subject from multiple perspectives and starting points, aiming to provide a rich and dynamic narrative that encompasses a wide range of references across time, authors, and languages (e.g., the first Greek poems, thinkers like Parmenides and Heraclitus, classical Greek and German languages), rather than a fixed or synthetic perspective on Being.
Place: a companion or a substitute concept for Being and beings?
Let’s take a break from Heidegger’s discourse to explore the possibility of considering ‘place’ as a substitute or companion concept for Being and beings, and to argue that the meaning of place can be just as extensive, far-reaching, and fundamental as Being itself.
Introducing the question of place as the ultimate ground: the Archytian Axiom. A place for ‘gathering’, ‘emerging’, and ‘abiding’: the ‘presence’ of Being and the ‘appearance’ of beings. Place as ‘domain of existence’
Recalling the various formulations of the Archytian axiom that I introduced on this website — ‘to be (at all) is to be in (some) place’—[13] we could say that Being cannot exist without a place where it can gather, develop, be defined as Being (the Being of beings), and ultimately take shape as actual, individual beings. To better understand Heidegger’s arguments and terminology, we can say that Being — ‘the emerging abiding sway’, this is one of the ways Heidegger characterized Being —[14] requires a gathering place where it can unfold, hold itself, and reveal its constant presence. To use a processual terminology, this gathering place is the common region where basic forces driving processes relate, unfold, and reveal their constant presence as Being, contrasting the opposing forces that can lead Being back into not-Being, and eventually may appear as individual beings in consequence of the actualization of such processes. In this sense, isn’t place a necessary requirement for conceiving Being, whether in thought or as a constant presence behind beings, real or imaginary? Isn’t the domain of thinking itself a place, where thoughts exist as ideas, language, assertions, symbolization, etc.? Isn’t the physical or ideal realm, where beings appear as concrete or abstract entities, also a realm of place? Doesn’t the occurrence of Being as a constant presence necessitate a place for it to unfold as a gathering force, emerge, and present itself, thereby emerging out of concealment? Finally, isn’t place a necessary co-presence for Being to be considered a happening or event, as Heidegger suggests?
Being Place Time-as-duration (of Processes)
Not a secondary question, from such constant presence, which can be eventually actualized into beings (whether real, imagined, or illusory), we derive our notions of ‘time’ in the sense of processes having a definite duration (from the actualization of processes into specific beings and their confrontation we derive the ordinary flow of time), or, in contrast, having infinite or indefinite duration, a conception of time as eternal present related to Being or beings as such.
Place: the ground for Being and beings. Different domains, reciprocal belonging, and the question of time
Originally, it’s possible to view Being and place, or beings and place, as a single event or presence from different perspectives (time-as-duration is intrinsic to their existence). When we consider Being (or beings in general), along with place, the domain of existence they share remains unaffected by timely contingencies (this is the sense of the constant presence of Being concealed behind beings). Since Being exists and is not Nothing, it has a localized presence that fills its own domain, which can be thought of as the contour of the region it occupies (any domain is a region, and any region is a place). On the other hand, when we refer to ‘beings and place’, what appears has a specific, limited duration, whether we’re speaking of real or imaginary beings and domains. In both cases, where there is one (Being or beings) there is the other — place. ‘Being and place’ or ‘beings and place’, can be reversed to ‘place and Being’ or ‘place and beings’, as we are discussing a co-presence. To convey the meaning of this ‘and’ as a ‘co-presence’, a simultaneous presence of two terms forming a unity, I sometimes use the notation of two brackets opposing each other: Being( )place, or beings( )place, which defines a unique event where Being and place – or beings and place – are equally determinative of that which exists (as I mentioned earlier, for the moment, I am omitting any explicit reference the component ‘time’ as time is inherent in processes, just like Being and place are). The simultaneous appearance and co-belonging of terms suggest that our ideal and substantial views of Being and beings (the ‘what-content’) are inherently linked with the spatial view (the ‘where-content’), or vice versa, in that place (or space, according to substantivalist perspectives) provides events or entities of any kind – physical or ideal – with the possibility to exist, offering them an existential domain without which nothing could exist. We cannot conceive of Being without a place (or space) no matter how generic that place (or space) can be. In the case of Being, that place, or space, simply refers to its domain of existence rather than its localization-as-(specific) position relative to other Being or beings. Similarly, we cannot think of a place or space without Being or beings, since place or space are not Nothing. So, Being is not nothing; it is the place where the emerging abiding sway comes into appearance and preserves itself as a constant presence, defeating the abyss of Nothing. Similarly, place is not Nothing — it is not the Void: it is Being itself fighting against Nothing — against the Void. So, ‘Being is the place where the emerging abiding sway comes into appearance…’ and ‘place is Being itself fighting against Nothing’; in other words, Being is place and place is Being. Being and place are built upon each other (and, I repeat, together with them there is always a temporal component, in the form of indefinite or definite duration of processes). It is because they are so difficult to discern in their co-belonging (a simultaneous appearance) that they can be seen con-fused into a single, unified presence (this is why, following Heidegger’s example, I have omitted the commas or conjunctions between Being, Place, and Time, in the headline above).[15] Anything, any entity, any presence, any phenomenon or event can be viewed as a place having certain characters, or a place where specific processes occur. At the same time, what is the essence of place and processes if not Being? What are beings if not the place of actualized processes? There is a reciprocal belonging between Being and place, or between beings and place: if they coexist indefinitely or infinitely, we refer to Being and place, or beings as such and place; if they coexist for a definite duration, we refer to beings and place.[16]
There is a reciprocal belonging between Being and place, or between beings and place
Place: the broadest, the deepest, the most originary concept
Earlier, I discussed the possibility that the concept of place could be as extended, far-reaching, and primordial as Being itself. I use the double assertion ‘Being and place’ or ‘beings and place’ because the concept of place, regardless of capital letters or plural forms, can adapt to everything that exists, serving as a foundation in both actuality and potentiality, thought and physical action, and the concrete and abstract realms. In essence, place is the realm itself. As an architect, I constantly oscillate between the actual and the potential, being and becoming, the concrete and the abstract, and I find the term ‘place’ more manageable than ‘Being’. Therefore, my goal is to explore the possibility of encompassing Being, beings, and place (or spatiality) – along with their inherent forms of temporalization – under the encompassing umbrella of place. This is the focus of my research: to redefine the concept of place (and, consequently, the meaning of spatiality), expanding its meaning beyond its typical understanding as a physical, geographical, or socially/culturally-constructed notion to include any dimensions of reality (any domain of existence), from physicochemical to biological, from ecological to sociocultural and intellectual aspects, thereby including metaphysical and symbolic dimensions (e.g., theories, values, ethics, beliefs, aspirations…). So, place – this place I am arguing for at RSaP – analogously to the narrative of Being (and beings) drawn by Heidegger, has the potential to be the broadest, the deepest, and the most originary concept.
Place and language
In Section A of Chapter One, titled ‘The why-question as the first of all questions’, Heidegger presents the metaphysical argument through the why-question, describing it as ‘the broadest in scope’, ‘the deepest’, and ‘the most originary’ question, while also introducing arguments or notions that are related to questions of place and space. Speaking about the broadest scope of the why-question, Heidegger has introduced the notion of ‘limit’, the notion of ‘domain’, and the notion of ‘Nothing’, when he says: ‘The domain of this question [Why are there beings…] is limited only by what simply is not and never is: by Nothing’.[17] Directly or indirectly, those are all spatial or, better, placial notions; concerning the notion of limit and its relevance for the concept of place, I redirect the reader to the article Limit Place Appearance. When Heidegger discusses the why-question as ‘the deepest’ of all questions, he suggests that it corresponds to a search for ‘the ground’: ‘Why — that is, what is the ground?… This why-question does not just skim the surface, but presses into the domains that lie “at the ground”, even pressing to the ultimate, to the limit.’[18] Again, questions of ‘limit’ and ‘domains’, and, in addition, another place-based concept: ‘the ground’. By posing the why-question, it seems inescapable that we must refer to spatial and/or placial notions. Doesn’t this confirm that the spatial and/or placial perspective is as fundamental as the ideal/universal and substantial/particular perspectives concerning Being and beings? Analogously to what we have just pointed out regarding Being (and beings), and the possibility of grounding them on place, it seems language itself cannot escape the power of spatial or placial notions. This should be quite obvious: isn’t language itself a being? How can a being exist without a place? How can it exist without a constant reference to what determines its existence? When we explored the concept of place from a linguistic perspective in our article Back to the Origins of Space and Place, we observed that the linguistic root of place was rooted in a basic vocabulary of a few fundamental words, including I, You, We, This, That, etc. which are considered essential to the Proto-Indo-European language, the precursor to modern European languages.[19] The question of Being and language is a fundamental topic for Heidegger to investigate the domain of metaphysics; we will revisit the intrinsic connection between questions of Being, language, and place in due time.
Chapter One — Section B. Philosophy as the asking of the why-question
To return to the resume of other important passages in the first chapter of Introduction to Metaphysics, in Section B, Philosophy as the asking of the why-question, Heidegger states that the why-question forms the basis of any form of understanding, not just philosophic understanding; all forms of understanding, including scientific problems, are derived from this original question: ‘No questioning, and consequently no single scientific “problem”, understands itself if it does not grasp the question of all questions, that is if it does not ask it.’ [20] Here, I will spend a few words on the important question of the relation between physics and metaphysics quoting a passage from Heidegger’s essay ‘On the being and conception of φύσις in aristotle’s physics B, 1’, where Heidegger dismisses as irrelevant the question of whether Aristotle’s book Physics precedes the Metaphysics: ‘it makes little sense to say that the Physics precedes the Metaphysics, because metaphysics is just as “physics” as physics is “metaphysics”.’ [21]
In this Section B, Heidegger also clarifies what philosophy is and is not about: genuine philosophy is untimely, as the questions it raises are not influenced by current events, rather the contrary: ‘philosophizing… imposes its measure on the times’.[22] Heidegger then addresses two common misconceptions about philosophy: ‘one misinterpretation consists in demanding too much of the essence of philosophy’, which means that this kind of knowledge should be regarded as ‘a thoughtful opening of the avenues and vistas of a knowing that establish measure and rank’ rather than a specific investigation of the forces and related mechanisms ‘that bring about a historical state of affairs.’[23] The other misinterpretation ‘involves a distortion of the sense of what philosophy can achieve’, in the sense that while ‘one expects philosophy to promote, and even accelerate, the practical and technical business of culture by alleviating it, making it easier’ the opposite is true: ‘philosophy never makes things easier, but only more difficult.’[24] This is the burden of philosophy according to Heidegger: to give ‘back to things, to beings, their weight (Being).’[25] Needless to say, there is a difference between those who teach philosophy, providing an educationally appropriate acquaintance with the subject (such as professors of philosophy), which Heidegger calls scholarship about philosophy, and genuine philosophy, which is philosophizing as the ‘questioning about the extra-ordinary’.[26]
Rethinkinspaceandplace.com: nature and place
The following section — Section C. Phusis: the fundamental Greek word for beings as such — which explores the fundamental Greek concept of phusis, has significant implications for our understanding of reality and the spatial concepts used to interpret it. Specifically, it enables us to reexamine concepts like place, freeing them from modernity’s false assumptions and reconnecting them with their original meanings, as understood through Heidegger’s interpretation of phusis as nature. I will address this question more extensively.
Why do places exist at all instead of Nothing? Why do places exist at all instead of the Void? This is where my mind went as soon as I first read Heidegger’s question: ‘Why are there beings at all instead of nothing?’ Just as Being, or beings in general, is delimited in contrast to Nothing, place is delimited in contrast to the void: when dealing with spatial and/or placial concepts, we often refer to Nothing as the “void” or “vacuum.” Isn’t the tagline “NATURA ABHORRET A VACUO” (vacuum is the Latin word for the void), which I placed just below the site title of this website (see Image 01, below), an indirect way to affirm the original sense of the why-question, essentially providing an assertion in response? ‘Why are there beings at all instead of nothing?’ Heidegger asks. Because nature abhors a vacuum —I say like many have said before me, starting with Aristotle. Nature contrasts with non-Being. Right now, we are going to introduce the connection between Being and nature, through the old Greek term ‘phusis’.
Image 01: ‘NATURA ABHORRET A VACUO’ , tagline of the previous RSaP WordPress theme
To me, the negation of the void is closely tied to the question of reality, understood as a plenum, or place. I soon came to consider my investigation into the concepts of space and place as a metaphysical question, rather than just an examination of physical, geographical, social, or architectural notions (see the article Places Everywhere—Everything Is Place). The common assertion NATURA ABHORRET A VACUO takes us to the heart of the metaphysical question addressed in Section C of Introduction to Metaphysics, where natura, the Latin term for the Greek concept phusis, plays a crucial role in understanding the question of Being and beings. Let’s examine Heidegger’s discussion on that.
Chapter One — Section C. Phusis: the fundamental Greek word for beings as such
Here, Heidegger introduces the concept of ‘phusis’, φύσις, a fundamental Greek word that originally referred to beings as such and as a whole. We read: ‘among the Greeks, when questioning about beings as such and as a whole received its true inception, beings were called “phusis”.’ [27]
among the Greeks, when questioning about beings as such and as a whole received its true inception, beings were called ‘phusis’
The Romans translated this word as ‘natura’, meaning ‘nature’, which is derived from the Latin signifying ‘to be born’, or ‘birth’. According to Heidegger, this is how the term ‘phusis’ was passed down to us, via Christianity and the Middle Ages; however, Heidegger argues, the Latin translation of the Greek term already pushed its original content aside, destroying ‘the authentic philosophical naming force of the Greek word.’[28] What happened? What was the original sense of that term? ‘What does the word “phusis” say?’, Heidegger asks. ‘It says what emerges from itself (for example, the emergence, the blossoming, of a rose), the unfolding that opens itself up, the coming-into-appearance in such unfolding, and holding itself and persisting in appearance—in short, the emerging-abiding sway.’[29]
‘Phusis’ … says what emerges from itself, the unfolding that opens itself up, the coming-into-appearance in such unfolding, and holding itself and persisting in appearance—in short, the emerging-abiding sway
Image 02: According to Heidegger, the Greek term ‘phusis’ — commonly translated as ‘nature’ — in the origin said ‘what emerges from itself… the unfolding that opens itself up, the coming-into-appearance in such unfolding, and holding itself and persisting in appearance—in short, the emerging-abiding sway.’
Heidegger sheds light on the question of phusis by examining the original meaning of the related Greek word ‘phuein’, which means ‘to grow’, ‘to make grow’ and asks: ‘Does it just mean to increase by acquiring bulk, to become more numerous and bigger?’[30] Heidegger provides examples to help us better understand the question, citing phusis as emergence, or the emerging-abiding sway, which we experience when we observe natural processes, such as the sun or moon rising, plants growing, animals being born, including humans, and so on. However, phusis cannot be directly equated with the processes actualized in forms of beings, phenomena, or events; instead, it is the underlying force that drives these processes, allowing them to unfold, become, and persist as Being or remain observable as beings – this is the emerging-abiding sway of phusis, precisely (here, Heidegger does not make any explicit reference to the term ‘force’, which is my choice). Therefore, according to Heidegger, phusis, in its original Greek sense, refers to ‘Being itself, by virtue of which beings first become and remain observable’;[31] in other words, it is the intrinsic connection between Being and beings: if we look behind the Being of beings, we find phusis.
Phusis is Being itself, by virtue of which beings first become and remain observable
Then, phusis is simultaneously the emerging force (the emerging sway) and the enduring reality over which it presides, enabling beings to emerge (to become) and remain observable.[32] This means that phusis, in its origin, is a broad concept that encompasses both ‘Being’ and ‘becoming’ – the former referring to fixed continuity, as expressed by the ideas of ‘enduring and holding sway’.[33] Heidegger’s formulation of phusis as ‘event’, stems from this understanding: ‘Phusis is the event of standing forth, arising from the concealed and thus enabling the concealed to take its stand for the first time.’[34]
Phusis is the event of standing forth, arising from the concealed and thus enabling the concealed to take its stand for the first time
Place as phusis (nature) — the domain of existence of Being and beings. Phusis as ‘event’: ‘emergence’, ‘standing forth’, and ‘appearance’ as place of processes
Before exploring how phusis came to be directly associated with nature and physical beings (narrowing its sense), I’d like to discuss the connection between this original understanding of phusis and the concept of place I’m developing at RSaP-Rethinking Space and Place. To show that, I will examine key Heideggerian words and phrases that serve as fundamental determinants for rethinking the concept of place, moving beyond traditional modern interpretations that restrict its power and intelligibility. Those keywords are: beings and Being as phusis, phusis as nature, emergence, standing, process, appearance, Being and becoming, and event. I have cited those terms respecting the order of presentation in which they appeared in Section C, following Heidegger’s discourse.
In Section C, the terms ‘Being’, ‘beings’, ‘phusis’ and ‘nature’ are intertwined to elucidate this fundamental concept: nature should be understood as the event of Being and the becoming of beings, which is the original meaning of the Greek term phusis. This event, phusis, encompasses both Being and becoming — Being( )becoming —, as I’ve previously illustrated elsewhere on this website.[35] The unfolding of this basic event, which narrates the structure of the domain of nature and its sub-domains, is represented by means of concepts such as ‘emergence’, ‘appearance’, and ‘standing’ or standing forth. This event unfolds as a basic process (Being) which is the foundation for a series of subsequent processes after which beings become and remain observable (and, with them, Being remains as well). So, we read: Phusis = Event = Being( )beings. If I’m not too far from Heidegger’s interpretation, this narrative has several parallels with my understanding of place as a system of processes, as discussed in my articles From Space to Place and What is Space ? What is Place? The keywords I listed, which Heidegger used to describe the event of phusis (nature) as the occurrence of Being( )beings, are the same concepts I’ve used in my articles to describe the event, the processuality, of place. These terms can be used to demonstrate how Being and place (or beings and place) can ultimately converge, suggesting a fundamental identity: as we previously mentioned, where there is one, there is the other. Let’s examine this question in more detail.
Processes, phusis, Being and beings; the nature of reality-as-place. The domains of nature
Heidegger defines the broad contours of the domain of existence, encompassing all beings and the process that offers ground to existence as such (Being), in terms of phusis. I interpret this encompassing domain of existence, along with the process from which everything emerges and presents itself, as ‘place’, whether it refers to Being or individual beings. I have also referred to this same domain using the terms ‘reality’ (‘reality is a place’, ‘reality is place-based’ etc.), or ‘nature’. The term ‘reality’ refers to the Latin word ‘res’ (thing), and as we already showed in the article What is a Thing?, its originary meaning encompasses both the physical and ideal, regardless of whether something is present or not: what the word ‘reality’ defines is the nature of the thing, its character or essence, that is the what-content, and not its presence or absence; so, the domain of reality is wide enough to house all that exists, in any state, from Being to beings, whether present or actual, and potential, concrete and abstract. As I’ve stated throughout the presentation of my thesis (in articles like Preliminary Notes, Places Everywhere—Everything Is Place, What is Place? What is Space?, or in the paper From Space to Place), reality is a place where processes occur and can be actualized as physicochemical, biological, social, and symbolic entities. The occurrence of processes, implying their active presence, can be seen as a way to describe the emergence of Being as an existing entity, while the actualization of these processes can define the appearance of beings as specific entities, ranging from physical to symbolic, including abstract, ideal, potential, imagined, or illusory entities. The processuality inherent in reality, whether we consider Being or individual beings in the Heideggerian sense, connects to my understanding of nature as described in ‘On The Structure of Reality’. Through a series of images based on Robert M. Pirsig’s quote, I illustrated natural and artificial processes that underlie all existence in the domain of nature, spanning from inorganic to symbolic realms, from individual beings to Being. The concept of Being as a metaphysical structure finds its place in the symbolic or intellectual domain (the place of thought), which is circularly related to all other domains. This structure of nature is also narrated through words in Image 2 of the article Preliminary Notes or Table 1, in the article From Space to Place, and is described again in Image 16 of the article Being as Place: Introduction to Metaphysics – Part Two (the Limitation of Being) To further substantiate my vision, which is grounded in systems thinking, I drew inspiration from Alfred N. Whitehead’s 1933 lecture, Nature and Life, where he outlined six types of natural occurrences, as discussed in the article The Place of Processes: Nature and Life.[36] These rough divisions offer a simple, direct, and synthetic way to characterize the processes of nature and nature itself as an all-encompassing place—the place of beings and Being (respectively, beings as the place of actualized processes, and Being as the place of processes, in general, or universal terms). Just as Heidegger defines the domain of existence (phusis—nature) in terms of Being and beings, I am defining it using the concept of place, which is always a place of processes, whether they take specific forms (in the domain of actuality) or not (permanence in the domain of potentiality). The divisions and continuity within the domain of place are based on an intrinsic processuality and have a significant correspondence with Heidegger’s conceptualization of beings and Being as nature (in the original Greek sense of phusis). In my view, processes validate reality, a stance I derived from Whitehead – whether it’s the universal essence of Being or the concrete, particular forms of beings (physicochemical, biological, social, and symbolic/intellectual).
Place, the domain of existence as an ‘event-process’: ‘emergence’, ‘coming into appearance’, ‘standing forth’. The observables. Being and becoming
Although Heidegger prefers the term ‘event’ over ‘process’, he attributes a fundamental processuality to Being: on one occasion, he explicitly states that Being should not be regarded ‘as just one process among others that we observe in beings…’, such as natural processes like the rising of the sun or the growth of plants.[37] It is in consequence of a more primal form of processuality that everything is opened up in a chain of subsequent processes that ultimately disclose as beings. This is why phusis can be identified with both Being and beings, at the same time, and why we are representing instances of an ‘event’, ultimately: ‘Phusis is Beings itself… the event of standing forth…’. This event initially discloses and reveals an emerging power, which Heidegger calls ‘the emerging sway’, holding, persisting, and enduring in its powerful action; this is a necessary condition for Being to exist (to emerge, hold, persist…) and for beings to appear, in contrast to the opposing forces of ‘Nothing’. Heidegger initially defines the coming into existence of Being as ‘unfolding’ and ‘emerging’, and later as ‘holding sway’, ‘persisting’, ‘enduring’, or ‘abiding’ in that sway; later, he also introduces the concept of ‘gathering’, as a moment of continuity and transition between these two forms of processuality — ‘emergence’ out of concealment and ‘standing forth’. The second series of terms — ‘holding’ (sway), ‘persisting’, ‘enduring’, and ‘abiding’ — which Heidegger uses to describe the event ‘Being’, or phusis, can be linked to the more basic condition of ‘standing’ or ‘taking a stand’, which are conceptualizations based on the notion of place, as discussed in previous articles.[38] Only if Being takes a stand, that is, only if it has a ‘spot’, ‘site’ or, more generally, a place where it can exercise its power and discloses itself, can beings come into appearance and become ‘observable’. This passage reveals the reciprocal relationship between Being and beings, as well as their understanding as phusis, or nature in its original Greek sense. In this overarching domain of existence, where processes originally appear as Being, endure in existence defeating the opposite forces that would reduce Being into Nothing, and eventually become and remain observable as beings (actualization of processes), Being and becoming are reciprocally included and oscillate into each other. The fundamental processuality that sustains both Being and beings is why phusis-as-nature can be considered an event. The fundamental structure, hidden beneath the original meaning of phusis, where Being and beings, as well as Being and becoming, oscillate into each other, shares many analogies with my understanding and tentative description of nature (or reality) as a place of processes. Heidegger’s terminology and conceptualizations also inform my notion of place, which shares certain characteristics: first, its emergent character, which, looking at the entangled complexity of nature, I first derived from systems thinking (General System Theory); later, I found it to have philosophical roots in the works of Samuel Alexander and, to some extent, Whitehead. Concerning this aspect of emergence, one of the first tentative definitions of the reformed notion of place I provided is: ‘Place is any real entity emerging from inorganic, organic, social and symbolic — or intellectual — processes’ (see What Is Place? What Is Space?; see also From Space to Place, where I similarly defined place as a system of processes, that is a phenomenon emerging from physicochemical, biological, social, and symbolic processes).
The concept of emergence: a place to conquer (for the Being of beings). Being and beings understood as ‘place of processes’. The phenomenon of place. The primacy of Place
The mechanism of emergence is crucial to Heidegger’s explanation of Being and beings, as well as my understanding of place, as it describes the manifestation, presentation, and presence of both Being and beings, other than the various properties of beings (physical beings especially, if we are in the realm of the observable). Through my usual placial jargon, by means of the concept of emergence I describe the coming into existence of Being and beings, understood as place of processes: Being and beings are the ‘real entities’ underlying my general definition of place (What is Place? What Is Space? – Paragraph 2). Being and beings are places—the place of processes.
Being and beings are the place of processes.
This is a crucial point: as Kant demonstrated, and as I have noted in previous articles, the term ‘real’ describes the character, essence, or what-content of an entity, rather than its physical presence;[39] thus, processes sustain every phase of existence, both for Being and for individual beings. Not only the emergence of processes is the first line of attack of Being against Nothing, (here, there is the ultimate battle — I would say the battle between contrasting forces to conquer a stand, that is, a place: only if a place is conquered existence begins); indeed, processes are necessary for beings to appear. While Being can be seen as the realm of processes as a whole or as such, using Heideggerian terms, beings can be thought of as the realm of actualized processes, where actualization refers to the final stage of formalization, resulting in entities that take on a specific form, whether they are present in reality or in the mind as abstract, conceptual, ideal, illusory, or imagined beings. Depending on the type of processes that occur and eventually actualize, we can categorize Being or beings into physicochemical, biological, social, and symbolic types (by ‘symbolic’, I mean related to human thinking, which is a uniquely human domain).
It is precisely in virtue of this coming into appearance (emergence) and abiding presence (standing forth) that Being and beings share with place that place is a phenomenon (from the Greek etymology of the word phainestai which means ‘to appear’).[40] An event is an occurrence (phusis is the occurrence of the Being and beings), and an occurrence is always an occurrence of processes: since any occurrence is always a ‘taking place’ of certain processes, the place taken (or ‘conquered’ — that’s why we also speak of place as ‘domain’: any domain is a dominion) by Being or by beings is something they have in common: however, it is not the same place, as the processes that sustain Being and beings differ in degree. Given that place accompanies both Being and beings (they both ‘take place’, as occurrences of nature-phusis) whenever they appear and persist in their presence, a place also appears and persists with them: so, we come back to place as the presence without which no Being or beings can emerge, manifest, and abide or resist in their manifestation (Archytian Axiom). ‘Emergence’, ‘manifestation’, and ‘abiding presence’ as place of processes. One might think that place is an absolute substrate (hupokeimenon) for Being and beings; but since place appears contextually to Being and beings and is not precedent to them (place is always the place of their emergence/appearance/manifestation, that is, place is always the place of processes sustaining Being and beings) it means that place, Being, and beings together (and together with time-as-duration, which is intrinsic to the processuality of place, Being, and beings), constitute the metaphysical and physical ground of any form of existence (here my view diverges from Heidegger in the sense that I am also considering the ultimate ground, like Heidegger, but I do not ascribe it to Being: I ascribe it to place, which is common to Being and beings, this fact paving the way for a multilevel ontology).
Place as standing forth. The stability of Being and place
To further explore the analogy between Heidegger’s terminology and conceptualizations and the reformed notion of place I invite readers to consider, I’d like to highlight another common aspect of Being and place (as well as beings and place): their characteristic of stability. In the absence of stability, no process could ultimately give rise to stable entities (beings), which means that place itself would cease to exist (I typically refer to physicochemical, biological, social, and symbolic entities as places, which are the actualization of their corresponding processes). Regarding the relationship between place and ‘stability’ — ‘standing forth’ is the term used by Heidegger in Section C, especially — characteristic of Being and beings, I have also discussed this at length in my article Body, Place Existence based on the phenomenological analysis of the gestures on the pitch by the football star Cristiano Ronaldo. I demonstrated how his famous motto ‘eu estou aqui’ (that is: ‘I am here’) – a genuine and naïve expression of the absolute necessity of a ‘here’ for Being or beings to exist – was reified through certain bodily gestures or stances, similar to a statue, denoting stability and constant presence. As I’ve mentioned elsewhere, these terms are built on the linguistic root ‘sta’, referring to a spot or place, ultimately. This place should be considered a necessary requirement for the existence of all beings, and even Being itself, as it provides a stable spot or seat for them to emerge; without it, without place, there would be no Being at all. In this way, we have returned to the principle established by the Archytian Axiom.
Returning to the resume of Introduction to Metaphysics, Heidegger concludes Section C of Chapter One by explaining how the original understanding of Being and beings as ‘emerging abiding sway’ eventually degenerated into ‘nature’, where natural beings were seen as physical, or material, entities. This shift towards a physical (material) understanding occurred when the domain of phusis was contrasted with the domain of technē, the human domain of abstract knowledge (which distinguishes humans from other living beings). As Heidegger puts it, ‘Phusis gets narrowed down by contrast with technē — which means neither art nor technology but a kind of knowledge, the knowing disposal over the free planning and arranging and controlling of arrangements.’ [41]
‘Phusis’ gets narrowed down by contrast with technē — which means neither art nor technology but a kind of knowledge the knowing disposal over the free planning and arranging and controlling of arrangements.
Here, Heidegger is quite elusive with his explanation and says: ‘it would require a special study to clarify what is essentially the same in phusis and technē’.[42] Therefore, to clarify this question, I will directly refer to that specific study, namely Heidegger’s commentary on Aristotle’s interpretation of phusis in the essay ‘On the being and conception of phusis in aristotle’s physics B, 1’.[43] Here, Heidegger showed how the Stagirite elaborated the interpretation of phusis, which was also based on the contraposition between phusis and technē. In its most basic sense, the contraposition is between what is created by nature (phusis) and what is created by humans, namely artefacts (technē, in the sense of ‘producing know-how’, or the ‘knowing disposal…’ as Heidegger referred to); beings made by nature, such as planets, seas, mountains, rivers, trees, birds, and insects, have an internal force that drives their birth, growth, development, movement, or rest. In contrast, beings created by humans, like the Strasbourg Cathedral, Bach’s fugues, and Hölderlin’s hymns, owe their existence to an external force – human beings and their ‘producing know-how’. This distinction between phusis and technē had a significant limiting consequence for humanity’s subsequent understanding of nature: the division of the physical from the psychical, with the mind or soul being seen as ‘ensouled’ or ‘alive’, as opposed to the merely physical or inorganic, which, in contrast, for the Greeks belonged to phusis as a whole. In brief, Heidegger argues that when phusis was transformed into ‘nature’ (in the narrower sense), the greatness of Greek philosophy’s inception came to an end, and phusis became a ‘philosophy of nature, a representation of all things according to which they are really of a material nature’ — e.g., atoms and electrons in modern physics.[44] According to Heidegger, this transformation was already underway in the academies of Plato and Aristotle; however, in Aristotle’s work, there was still a lingering echo of the original understanding of phusis, as seen when he refers to ‘the grounds of beings as such’, in the Metaphysics.[45]
Image 03: Strasbourg and its cathedral.
Reality and Nature: ‘phusis’ as the place of processes
A brief note on what we’ve just discussed, along with my interpretation of the concept of place. In my view, understanding reality, or nature, as a realm of processes (i.e., the place of processes, precisely) – including physicochemical, biological, social, and symbolic ones – aligns with the original concept of phusis, which encompasses both the physical and psychical aspects, transcending subsequent divisions and dualisms. To me, the continuity and unity, or solidarity, between the different aspects of nature is given by place itself, which is common to all. The inclusive domain of Being and beings, which the ancient Greeks referred to as phusis, is essentially the domain of place, as it provides the common ground for reconciling all divisions within a unified whole. Unity is substantiated by place. From physicochemical processes like planets and rocks, to biological and social processes like grass and human institutions, to cultural and symbolic processes like the Strasbourg cathedral and Einstein’s field equations, all these individual beings share the same placial structure, which is one for all, even if it exists on different levels (see On the Structure of Reality), with Being as the common ground—the place of processes for all that exists. By positing place as the origin of all differentiation, we surpass any subsequent distinctions between beings, whether they are physical, psychical, or otherwise, and instead recognize that beings are ultimately places, interconnected in a chain of solidarity that forms the singular, nested place of the Cosmos as an ordered system. Places everywhere, everything is a place (see the article Places Everywhere—Everything Is Place). Rocks, insects, human beings, equations, and hymns are fundamentally the same: they are all places where processes occur, not just metaphorically, but in a strict sense. Place, along with its accompanying processes, enables me to say that I am in rocks, in the sea, in a tree, or in a poem, just as those beings are in me. It is place, understood as the reality of processes, that allows us to recover the fundamental solidarity or withness between diverse beings, including humans, tracing back to their common source of existence: place as the Being of beings. Ultimately, we are all places. Consider Image 9 and Image 10 in the article Places Everywhere—Everything Is Place: aren’t the curved and straight lines, representing relations and processes, the common ground for all that exists? Aren’t those forms a way for Being and beings to emerge from concealment, whether in the form of a human being (represented by Pollock’s face in Image 9) or a model anticipating the structure of an architecture (Image 10)? Here, beyond appearances, the solidarity between the physical and the psychical (the domains at the extremities of all that exists, which encompass reality as One domain, from physicochemical to symbolic or intellectual, from phusis to technē) emerges in the form of relation: place is their common thread, allowing those relations to exist and beings to appear and stand forth. This hypothesis proposes that the dichotomy between phusis (natural beings) and technē (humans producing know-how) or the physical and psychical is reconciled within the broader concept of place, which encompasses all processes. This redefinition of existence through place gives it a comprehensive dimension, similar to the original meaning of phusis that Heidegger described. Ultimately, my central argument is that by rethinking our understanding of place (and, consequently, of spatiality), we can restore and revitalize our connection with nature in its original Greek sense as phusis.
by way of ‘place’, we can rediscover and recover our relationship with nature
Coming back to the resume of Introduction to Metaphysics, Heidegger uses the brief reference to Aristotle and the distinction between physics and metaphysics as an opportunity to explain the meaning of metaphysics and assert the priority of philosophical thinking over scientific thinking in the next Section D.
Chapter One — Section D. The meaning of ‘Introduction to Metaphysics’
To inquire about Being in general means to look beyond individual beings, and thus, this form of inquiry seeks to transcend the natural world in the narrower sense. In Greek, ‘natural things’ or ‘what naturally is’ is referred to as ‘ta physica’. However, when we inquire about Being, we’re not concerned with a specific domain of nature, such as inanimate bodies, plants, or animals, which are all natural beings. Instead, we want to move beyond ‘ta physica’. In this way, we enter the domain of metaphysics, which, as Heidegger explains, is derived from the Greek ‘meta’, meaning ‘beyond’ or ‘over beyond’, resulting in the expression ‘meta ta physica’. Then, as Heidegger puts it, ‘Philosophical questioning about beings as such is meta ta phusika; it questions on beyond beings, it is metaphysics’;[46] therefore, asking ‘Why are there beings at all instead of nothing?’ — that is, inquiring about the Being of beings — is to enter the domain of metaphysics. The why-question ‘is the fundamental question of metaphysics. Metaphysics stands as the name for the center and core that determines all philosophy.’[47] Then, phusis, meaning ‘physics’ in the ancient sense, already transcends natural beings, effectively becoming metaphysics (‘meta ta physica’). This is why Heidegger states, ‘Physics [as phusis] determines the essence and the history of metaphysics from the inception onward.’ [48]
Heidegger notes that the lecture course does not delve into metaphysics itself, but rather provides an introduction to it (that’s why it was later published as Introduction to Metaphysics). Heidegger uses the term ‘introduction’ to emphasize the path that leads to metaphysics, specifically the path that guides us ‘into the asking of the fundamental question’;[49] then, Heidegger says, ‘the lecture course asks about the disclosedness of Being. Disclosedness means: the openedness of what the oblivion of Being closes off and conceals.’ [50]
Chapter One — Section E. Unfolding the Why-question by means of the question of Nothing
How the question of Being (and beings) is intuitively connected to the question of Nothing, I’ve already anticipated in a passage above when I made reference to the tagline that accompanies the title of this website: NATURA ABHORRET A VACUO (Image 01, above). Let’s see how Heidegger elucidates this metaphysical question, more in detail.
What seems a superfluous addition in the formulation of the Why-question — the final part ‘instead of nothing’ in the question ‘Why are there beings at all instead of nothing?’ — is not superfluous at all: it is an integral part of the question. Rather, according to Heidegger, this formulation of the Why-question shows that the question of Being and the question of Nothing are reciprocally connected and have gone side by side since their inception. According to traditional thinking, speaking about ‘nothing’ seems illogical, as it implies making it into something, and its inclusion in talk appears to lead to ‘pure nihilism’ (‘Talking about Nothing is illogical… Such talking about Nothing consists in utterly senseless proposition… Talking about Nothing is not only completely contrary to thought, but it undermines all culture and all faith. Whatever both disregards the fundamental law of thinking and also destroys faith and the will to construct is pure nihilism’).[51] Heidegger wonders if this traditional way of thinking rests on a misunderstanding: ‘what if both the concern for the proper respect for the fundamental rules of thinking as well as the fear of nihilism, which would both like to advise against talk of Nothing, rested on a misunderstanding?’ [52] The answer is immediate: ‘This is in fact the case… This lack of understanding stems from an oblivion of Being.’[53] The connection between the question of Being and the question of Nothing serves as the underlying theme for the remainder of the book, introduced in Section E.5., below. Before exploring this specific question, Heidegger takes this opportunity to assert the superiority of philosophy (and poetry) over logic and science in Section E.3.: ‘it is only an illusion of rigor and scientificity when one appeals to the principle of contradiction, and to logic in general, in order to prove that all thinking and talk about Nothing is contradictory and therefore senseless… One cannot, in fact, talk about and deal with Nothing as if it were a thing, such as the rain out there, or a mountain, or any object at all; Nothing remains in principle inaccessible to all science… But this is a great misfortune only if one believes that scientific thinking alone is the authentic, rigorous thinking, that it alone can and must be made the measure even of philosophical thinking. But the reverse is the case.’[54] Heidegger concludes his critique of logic and science: ‘All scientific thinking is just a derivative and rigidified form of philosophical thinking. Philosophy never arises from or through science. Philosophy can never belong to the same order as the sciences. It belongs to a higher order’.[55] Poetry, alongside philosophy, also belongs to this ‘higher order’; according to Heidegger, the poet can also talk about Nothing ‘and not because the procedure of poetry, in the opinion of everyday understanding, is less rigorous, but because, in comparison to all mere science, an essential superiority of the spirit holds sway in poetry’.[56] An example of such poetic discussion of Nothing is given by Heidegger in Section E.4., using the example of The Road Leads On, 1934, by the Norwegian author Knut Hamsun, awarded with the Nobel Prize in Literature in 1920.
Heidegger now raises the crucial question about the relationship between Being and Nothing (Section E.5.), which will serve as the underlying theme for the remainder of Chapter One, particularly in the effort to establish a stable foundation for the elusive essence of Being.
Chapter One — Section E.5. The wavering of beings between Being and the possibility of not-Being
This passage is crucial to understand Heidegger’s metaphysical discourse: it is to understand the threshold that divides beings (and Being, which is intrinsic to them) from not-Being, the event that allows Being and beings to pass the threshold that leads into the domain of existence, as well as the event that prevents beings and their Being to fall back, behind that threshold, into the abyss of Nothing. When we consider that threshold, we come to understand that what appears to be a simple addition to the why-question – the assertion ‘instead of nothing’, which follows and completes ‘why are there beings at all’– actually serves to highlight that beings are not unquestionably given; rather, they are merely a possibility, just like not-Being. By way of that question Heidegger is actually asking: ‘Why are beings torn from the possibility of not-Being? Why do they not fall back into it constantly with no further ado? Beings are now no longer what just happens to be present at hand; they begin to waver…’.[57] Heidegger continues: ‘From now on, beings as such waver, insofar as we put them into question. The oscillation of this wavering reaches out into the most extreme and sharpest counterpossibility of beings, into not-Being and Nothing. The search for the Why now transforms itself accordingly. It does not just try to provide a present-at-hand ground for explaining what is present at hand — instead, we are now searching for a ground that is supposed to ground the dominance of beings as an overcoming of Nothing. The ground in question is now questioned as the ground of the decision for beings over against Nothing’.[58] Heidegger’s statement may help explain why it’s fitting to discuss a domain of existence when considering Being and beings: every time Being triumphs over not-Being, a ‘battle’ ensues to establish a place, a dominion, and thus a domain under the sunlight (‘…a ground that is supposed to ground the dominance of beings’). In this case, to speak about place as a dominion, as the ultimate ground (for being), is evidently an opportune metaphor.
It is now clear that the seemingly superfluous addition ‘instead of nothing’ is actually an essential component of the question, which focuses on the possibility of oscillation between beings and nothing. This reminds us of Heidegger’s statement in a previous section: the primary argument of the lecture course, Introduction to Metaphysics, revolves around the disclosedness of Being, which brings Being to the forefront and introduces its unfolding into beings. So, we are discussing ‘beings, in their wavering between not-Being and Being. Insofar as beings stand up against the extreme possibility of not-Being, they themselves stand in Being’.[59] However, we still need to clarify the relationship between Being and beings, namely, how what we call Being relates to beings themselves, which ultimately leads us back to understanding the nature, status, and precise meaning of Being: ‘How does it stand with Being?’,[60] Heidegger asks. That is: ‘What about Being? What is its status?’, as the translators Fried and Polt say.
How does it stand with Being?
This is the subject of the next section, Section F.
The threshold of reality
Before examining the relationship between Being and not-Being, I would like to take a brief pause and reflect on my previous attempts (prior to reading Heidegger’s Introduction to Metaphysics) to visualize the oscillation between not-Being and beings, in light of this newly acquired knowledge; while in a passage above, I referred to that oscillation as ‘a threshold’, I discussed this question in the article Place, Space, and the Fabric of Reality. Drawing on Plato’s and Whitehead’s cosmologies, I imagined this moment of transition between beings and not-Being as a sieve-like structure (see Image 08, in that article) where the world of sensible forms and the world of ideas converge (a bastard, third kind of reality… according to Plato’s Timaeus). Referencing Whitehead’s metaphysics, I viewed this passage as a shift from a domain of pure processes to a domain of physical entities generated by the actualization of those processes. Ultimately, I envisioned a horizon of co-existing binary oppositions: abstract and concrete, mind and matter, potential and actual, being and becoming. Can this schematic model be adapted to Heidegger’s metaphysics of Being and beings in relation to not-Being? In other words, can the metaphysics of Plato and Whitehead coexist within the structure of Being presented by Heidegger? How? Our understanding of ‘the physical’ in the expanded way Heidegger is explaining, rooted in the original conception of phusis, is necessary to admit the coexistence of these seemingly disparate models.
Chapter One — Section F. The prior question: How does it stand with Being?
‘How does it stand with Being?’, Heidegger asks. That is: What is the status of Being? What about Being? What is its meaning? What does Being consist of, precisely? The scope of these questions is to elucidate the difference between beings and Being, which still escapes us. Heidegger suggests taking a piece of chalk to illustrate this question: it has extension, and relative stability, that is, it has a stable form and color while we observe it and, most importantly, it exists here. However, the chalk has the possibility of not being here and being somewhere else, or being smaller, and being drawn along the blackboard, and so on. All these possibilities are inherent in the essence of the chalk, its ‘nature’: ‘the chalk itself, as this being, is in this possibility… Every being, in turn has this Possible in it.’[61] The possibility that exists between Being and not-Being is precisely what Heidegger referred to in the previous Section as the ‘wavering of beings’; according to him, ‘insofar as beings stand up against the extreme possibility of not-Being, they themselves stand in Being.’[62] Being appears ‘wider’ than beings since it encompasses them: beings exist within Being. Yet, we remain unclear about their difference: ‘The distinction!’[63] Heidegger asks with emphasis: we are seeking their distinction. To discuss this ambiguity that seems inherent in beings and Being, we have just seen two different ways for a being to be (using a piece of chalk as an example), or to stand in Being: first, as something that is actually present, with specific characteristics like disposition, color, and form; and second, as a potential presence, a possibility that is always inherent in beings as long as they exist, rather than not existing. The ambiguity surrounding the meaning of the word ‘being’ is reflected in the Greek term ‘to on’. As Heidegger notes in an important passage: ‘On the one hand, being means what at any time is in being, in particular this greyish-white, light, breakable mass, formed in such and such away. On the other hand, “being” means that which, as it were, “makes” this be a being instead of nonbeing <nichtseiend>, that which makes up the Being in the being, if it is a being. In accordance with this twofold meaning of the word “being,” the Greek “to on” often designates the second meaning, that is, not the being itself, what is in being, but rather “the in-being,” beingness, to be in being, Being. In contrast, the first meaning of “being” names the things themselves that are in being, either individually or as a whole, but always with reference to these things and not to their beingness, ousia. The first meaning of “to on” designates “ta onta” (entia), the second means “to einai” (esse).’[64]
On the ambiguous meaning of ‘being’:
ENTITY (Gr. ta onta, Lat. entia) and/or
ESSENCE (Gr. to einai, Lat. esse), that is ‘beingness’ (Gr. ousia)
We have made progress in defining beings and Being, but a crucial question remains:: ‘where is Being situated? and how Being stands in its distinction from beings?’, Heidegger inquires once more. To summarize, following Heidegger, these are our fundamental questions: 1) ‘We are asking about the ground for the fact that beings are, and are what they are, and that there is not nothing instead’;[65] This question echoes the one with which we began our inquiry into Being: Why are there beings at all instead of Nothing? 2) ‘We are interrogating beings in regard to their Being’, that is, we are asking about their distinction.[66] To do this, we must first clarify the character of Being, which raises the question: 3) ‘How does it stand with Being?’, that is, ‘What is the status of Being? What about Being?’[67]
Still in Section F.1 of Chapter One, Heidegger now provides examples to illuminate the enigmatic concept of Being, which currently appears to be nothing more than an empty phrase, a mere sound devoid of meaning, a flatus vocis, that is ‘no more than the sound of a word’, as Heidegger himself puts it. ‘Everywhere we find beings’, Heidegger says (to continue the analogy between Being, beings, and place, which is the subject of this article, similarly to Heidegger’s assertion, introducing this website I’ve argued that ‘everywhere we find places’ in the article Places Everywhere—Everything Is Place). A building, including everything in it, such as people, stairs, classrooms, and furnishings, is a being; so too are a heavy thunderstorm, a distant mountain, a Romanesque portal, a state (like Germany or England), or a painting by Van Gogh. These are all beings, according to Heidegger. But the key question is: What is the Being of (those) beings? ‘Everything we have mentioned “is”, after all, and nevertheless—if we want to lay hold of Being it is always as if we were reaching into a void. The Being that we are asking about is almost like Nothing’.[68] This is Heidegger’s provisory conclusion: ‘Being remains undiscoverable, almost like Nothing, or in the end entirely so. The word “Being” is then finally just an empty word. It means nothing actual, tangible, real. Its meaning is an unreal vapor. So in the end Nietzsche is entirely right when he calls the “highest concepts” such as Being “the final wisp of evaporating reality”.’[69] This puzzling question — Is Being a vapor? An error? — is further elaborated in Section F2. Nietzsche: Being as a vapor.
Now we ask: Is it really so? Is Being really a vapor, an error? To instil some doubts on that provisional conclusion, Heidegger poses additional questions: ‘What if the fault is not our own, we of today, nor that of our immediate or most distant forebears, but rather is based in a happening that runs through Western history from the inception onward…? What if it were possible that human beings… have a relation to beings but have long since fallen out of Being, without knowing it, and what if this were the innermost and most powerful ground of their decline?’[70] These questions introduce the final section of Chapter One.
Section F.3. Our destroyed relation to Being and the decline of the West
Here, Heidegger attempts to clarify the meaning of the aforementioned questions and explore how they shape the current situation in the Western world, particularly in Europe, which remains relevant even today, albeit within a historically grounded perspective. In brief, Heidegger believes that our inability to understand the essence of Being and beings is linked to the spiritual decline of the modern world, which is characterized by the disempowerment, dissolution, diminution, suppression, and misinterpretation of the spirit;[71] Heidegger enumerates the essential happenings concerning such a ‘darkening’ in this way: ‘the flight of the gods, the destruction of the earth, the reduction of human beings to a mass, the preeminence of the mediocre’;[72] according to Heidegger, asking about beings as such and as a whole, or asking the question of Being, is one of the essential conditions for awakening the spirit.[73] This ‘disempowering of the spirit’ is evidently a specific condition of a particular type of being: the human being. A being which, now, we should better render with the original Heideggerian term Dasein, which is not used in an anthropological, psychological, or biological sense to define the human being, but, rather, to describe ‘a condition into which human beings enter, either individually or collectively, at a historical juncture when Being becomes an issue for them’;[74] and this is exactly the case: we, as human beings, have lost all sense of the original meaning of Being. This loss is a historical one — the fruit of a historical event that Heidegger referenced when he questioned our inability to grasp the concept of Being (the vapor… the void word – here is the loss!), the consequence of a happening that runs through Western history from the inception onward. At that historical juncture and, more intensely, in modern times, ‘Dasein began to slide into a world that lacked [that] depth… All things sank to the same level… The prevailing dimension became that of extension and number. To be able… means only practicing a routine in which anyone can be trained, always combined with a certain amount of sweat and display… this all intensified until it turned into the measureless so-on-and-so-forth of the ever-identical and the indifferent, until finally this quantitative temper became a quality of its own. By now… the predominance of a cross-section of the indifferent is no longer something inconsequential and merely barren but is the onslaught of that which aggressively destroys all rank and all that is world-spiritual, and portrays these as a lie. This is the onslaught of what we call the demonic [in the sense of the destructively evil]. There are many omens of the arising of this demonism… One such omen is the disempowering of the spirit’.[75] Heidegger then lists aspects of this ‘misinterpretation’ or ‘disempowering’ of the spirit, which can be summarized as the triumph of quantity and number over quality and poetic image, and of intellect over spirit and body. The way to recover the original power of the spirit intrinsic to Dasein (Heidegger speaks about the ‘awakening of the spirit’), occurs through ‘asking the question of Being’.[76]
For the moment, the provisional conclusion of this introductory discourse on Being is that Being appears to us as a void word, a vapor, an evanescent meaning. This question coincides with the fact that many essential words are in the same situation; this is a consequence of our misrelation to language, which ‘in general is used up and abused’.[77] However, this is not a specific instance of language abuse; on the contrary, ‘the destroyed relation to Being as such is the real ground for our whole misrelation to language.’[78]
The conclusion of Chapter One, which explores the intimate relation (a distorted relation…) between Being and language, leads us to the second chapter, which examines the question of Being from a linguistic perspective: can we successfully determine the meaning of Being through its grammatical and etymological analysis? This is Heidegger’s next step. Before that, let me offer a couple of considerations to illustrate how Heidegger’s latter remarks on the disempowering of the spirit can be connected to the spatial/placial question that interests us so much.
The disempowerment of the spirit and the empowerment of space. The triumph of space over place. On void words and evanescent meanings: space misplaced for place. Place: a way to recover the originary spirit of Being and beings as phusis. The complementarity between place and space
When Heidegger spoke about the darkening of the world and the misinterpretation of the spirit, in a few strokes he described a phenomenon that has unfolded throughout Western history, from its inception to the present modern era, where he argues that the dominant perspective has become one of extension and number (quantification). To me, those words have terrific descriptive power: no one has described the history of mankind over the last 25 centuries more concisely and accurately than Heidegger.
From its inception to the present modern era, the dominant perspective throughout Western history has become one of extension and number (quantification)
I regard ‘extension’ and ‘number’ as icons of modernity, representing quantity and measurability, and symbolizing what human spirituality has become. Icons of Space. What is space, if not pure extension, measurability, and quantity, which can be measured and expressed as a number? The concept of space is crucial to understanding Western history, particularly in how it has led to the disempowerment of the spirit, where I take ‘spirit’ as the driving force behind qualitative values that resist quantification, mass production, and seriality, which are all hallmarks of modernity.
I regard ‘extension’ and ‘number’ as icons of modernity, representing quantity and measurability, and symbolizing what human spirituality has become. Icons of Space.
From the perspective of spatial and placial concepts, I have reviewed in a few articles (Place and Space: A Philosophical History, Space and Place: A Scientific History – Part One and Part Two, Concepts of Place, Space, Matter, and the Nature of Physical Existence and Place, Space, Matter, and a New Conception of Nature) how Western history has been shaped by a significant transformation: the shift in men’s understanding of nature (phusis, in the narrower sense) from being place-based to being space-based. The transformation ‘from place to space’ is not a coincidence or a side effect; rather, it stems from a fundamental disconnection with Being, which in turn underlies our misrelation to spatial concepts. Here, the expression ‘spatial concepts’ replaces the one used by Heidegger, that is, ‘language’. This is consonant with Heidegger’s pronunciation: after all, what space and place are if not ‘words’, that is, elements of language? The same way ‘Being’ was deprived of its original meaning and driving force, so ‘place’ was: from a metaphysical agent, the place of Being — this is the powerful message behind the Archytian axiom —, and from an active physical agent — this is the powerful message behind Aristotle’s conception of place as topos (which, indeed, had also a metaphysical connotation as there was no strict separation between the two dimensions at the time of Aristotle) —, place, through Western history, transformed into a passive background, eventually taking the semblance of a ‘site’ or ‘location’ dispersed within space: a metaphysical and a physical loss, as noted by Edward S. Casey (‘Without place, things would not only fail to be located; they would not even be things: they would have no place to be the things they are. The loss would be ontological and not only cosmological: it would be a loss in a kind of being and not merely in the number of beings that exists’).[79] With my research, I aim to recover both senses of place, the metaphysical and the physical, understanding place as a system of processes, from physicochemical to biological, from ecological to social, from cultural to intellectual or symbolic. The gathering-where of the forces unfolding, standing forth, and presenting as Being (this is the place of processes, in its most universal sense) and eventually coming into beings (this is the place of actualized processes, where things, life, societies, and thoughts/symbols are the positive outcomes of such processes) represents the complementarity between metaphysical and physical states of place. The where is one thing with the when (precessuality in the form of duration) of what exists, whether in actuality or potentiality, in particular or universal sense. This all-encompassing structure of place, a domain or dominion of existence, is where the Being of beings recovers its original meaning as phusis in its broadest sense.
Having proposed a way to recover the originary sense of place, as the grounding domain of Being and beings, of being and becoming (in due time, in parallel with Heidegger’s discourse, we will also explore additional ‘properties’ of this domain of place), I would like to add a few more considerations about space. After years of observation and contemplation on this subject, I believe that few words have undergone a transformation in meaning as profound as ‘space’ has — I’m referring to its modern interpretations and the significance we’ve attributed to it over the last few centuries, often at the expense of other spatial concepts like, e.g., place or the field. This, I argue, is a consequence of our misguided relationship with language, which, as Heidegger warned, has been ‘used up and abused’. ‘Space’ or the constant reference to space — I say — is a prime example of language being used up and abused. What I find almost incredible is that, despite its fleeting meaning, people throughout history have attempted to fill that evanescence in many different ways, not just metaphorically or linguistically, but physically, especially! It is seems quite obvious that space is an abstract concept and that no ‘physical space’ truly exists, except as an element of language (therefore, its domain of existence is not physical but symbolic). That expression is just an unwarranted oxymoron. Despite that, modern attempts to transform a flatus vocis into matter were successful, turning the world upside down and nobody protesting for that; or, better, with some eminent thinkers protesting for that, and many of them changing their minds on the subject multiple times, including Kant and Einstein (I redirect you to the histories of place and space I already reviewed in the past articles), to point out how the question of space and place is indeed subtle. Today, we are still far from a shared understanding of the nature of space (and place). I suggest that their concealed meaning is connected to the question of Being, as Heidegger elaborated, and that their ‘unconcealment’ (the unconcealment of their original meaning) is simultaneous with the ‘unconcealment’ of Being and beings. To understand the fundamental concept of Being, we must also grasp the fundamental power of place and space, which are complementary yet distinct notions that cannot be reduced to one another, as we have seen throughout the history of Western thought. I aim to reestablish the complementary relationship between place and space by recognizing that they are interconnected aspects of reality in the following sense: while place is concrete, to begin with (which means that it can also have abstract dimensions—this is an obvious consequence of the definition I gave: ‘place is any real entity emerging from inorganic, organic, social and symbolic — or intellectual — processes’), space lacks physical dimensions and exists solely as an abstract concept. As I’ve noted before, we must exercise caution when applying the concept of space across different domains as its powerful metaphorical influence leads us to confuse the abstract with the concrete, mistaking space for place (e.g., the notion of background space, which is another misnomer). This is the appropriate moment to recall this quote from Middlemarch, by George Eliot: ‘… all of us, grave or light, get our thoughts entangled in metaphors, and act fatally on the strength of them’ (see the article Entangled in Space).
Finally, one last consideration regarding the disempowerment of the spirit and the empowerment of space. I link the overturning of the meanings of place and space to a shift in how we perceive place: initially, it had ‘felt qualities’ — physical and concrete aspects, consistent with the Aristotelian view — but over time, this physical connotation has been lost, replaced by the more ephemeral nature of space. The invention of the concept of absolute space by Newton marked the pinnacle of this millenary transformation process. Space, as a representation of ‘dimension and number’, typical traits of modernity, has enabled the substitution of quality and spirit, which are inherent to place, with quantity. Today, we can observe this transformation in the widespread use of the term ‘space’, which has become a Trojan horse for the market economy and industry due to its numerical and quantitatively measurable character, allowing it to be assigned a market value, organized, and quantified, ultimately leading to its triumphant adoption in every sector of modern and contemporary society (‘the epoch of space’ according to French philosopher Michel Foucault). In my photographic report, Spatiophilia, I have attempted to illustrate the extent to which the concept of space has triumphed, conquering people’s minds and replacing the names of places. This photographic report explores how the concepts of space and place are perceived and used with communicative intent in the streets of Milano. Although sometimes used interchangeably, the report reveals that the ratio of ‘space’ to ‘place’ is 5:1, indicating that ‘space’ appears five times more frequently than ‘place’ in signs, billboards, shop windows, public banners, warnings, and communications. A clear sign that the modern mind is more drawn to the vacuity and indeterminateness of space than to the physicality and specificity of place.
Image 04a,b: What we used to call ‘shop’, ‘store’, ‘boutique’, ‘showroom’, ‘office’, ‘park’, ‘flowerbed’, etc., — which are all different typologies of place — we have flattened behind a single representative word: ‘space’. ‘SPACE AVAILABLE (for) SHORT TERM RENTAL’ the sign says. Photos from the series ‘Spatiophilia’: photographic report on how the terms ‘space’ and ‘place’ are perceived and used with communicative intent through the streets of Milano – Alessandro Calvi Rollino Architetto.
Chapter Two: On the Grammar and Etymology of the Word ‘Being’
Heidegger’s struggle to understand the concept of Being led him to take the next step: analyzing the word ‘Being’ linguistically to overcome the obstacles to its comprehension. This linguistic analysis consists of two parts: first, the investigation of the formal characteristics of the word ‘Being’, that is, its ‘grammar’, which is the focus of Section B. The grammar of ‘Being’. Second, the investigation of the originary meaning of the word ‘Being’, which is the focus of Section C. The etymology of ‘Being’.
Before those two sections, in the introductory Section A. The superficiality of the science of linguistics, Heidegger warns us that linguistic forms (such as present indicative, imperfect, infinitive, substantive, etc.) are mere technicalities or mechanisms that we have used ‘to dissect language and establish rules [so that, in the end] language and the study of language have gotten stuck in these rigid forms as if in a net of steel.’[80] Language and its rules contributed to transforming words into empty shells. According to Heidegger, unless we succeed in creating a spiritual environment in our schools, replacing the current scientific atmosphere, our efforts to understand language, in general, and Being, in particular, will be in vain. Finally, he emphasizes that the upcoming linguistic analysis ‘is an essential clarification of the essence of Being as regards its essential involvement with the essence of language.’[81]
Chapter Two — Section B. The grammar of the Word ‘Being’
Let’s start with the analysis of the word ‘Being’.
Chapter Two — Section B.1. The derivation of the noun “das Sein” [Being] from the infinitive “sein” [to be]
Heidegger introduces this question by noting that ‘Being’ <das Sein> behaves similarly to other verbal forms like ‘going’, ‘falling’, ‘dreaming’, etc., which, like nouns such as ‘bread’, ‘house’, ‘thing’, etc., function as names. According to Heidegger, the verb has been transformed into a substantive, used like a name, and this has been done ‘by way of a definite form of the verb (the temporal word) that in Latin is called the “modus infinitivus”,’ Heidegger says.[82] So, ‘Being’ is a hybrid form, derived from the two basic forms of language: the verb and the substantive. This is why the grammatical form ‘Being’ is also referred to as a ‘verbal substantive’.[83] So, we have: 1) the verb, which expresses an action in various temporal modes such as present, imperfect, past, etc. 2) the infinitive, which represents a specific mode of the verb, in this case ‘to be’; 3) the substantive, or name, which denotes an ‘a-temporal’ mode of expression. To analyze ‘Being’, we must start with the modus infinitivus, the form ‘to be’, since it is the decisive precursor in the formation of the verbal substantive ‘Being’.[84]
‘With the question about the essence of the substantive and of the verb — Heidegger observes — we find ourselves in the midst of the question about the essence of language’.[85] We often wonder about the order of precedence between verbs and names in regard to the primordial form of the word — ‘whether the primordial form of the word is the noun (substantive) or the verb’—[86], but Heidegger puts off answering that question.
Chapter Two — Section B.2. The derivation of the Latin term modus infinitivus from Greek philosophy and grammar
The term ‘infinitive’ for a verb (to go, to come, to fall… to be) originates from the Latin ‘modus infinitivus’, which is ‘the mode of unboundedness, of indeterminateness, regarding the manner in which a verb exercises and indicates the function and direction of its meaning.’[87] The real basis for that grammatical form is not Latin, but rather Greek, stemming from the work of Greek grammarians, so we must examine the analysis of the Greek language (and philosophy).
Chapter Two — Section B.2.a. ‘Onoma’ and ‘rhema’ as examples of the dependence of Greek grammar on Greek philosophy
According to Heidegger, the development of Western grammar began with the meditation of the Greeks on language. One of the first and decisive sources of the division of language into nouns and verbs (in the Greek form of ‘onoma’ and ‘rhema’) is the work of Plato (in the Sophist), a division ‘worked out and first established in the most immediate and intimate connection with the conception and interpretation of Being.’ [88]
One of the first and decisive sources of the division of language into nouns and verbs (in the Greek forms of ‘onoma’ and ‘rhema’) is the work of Plato (in the Sophist), a division ‘worked out and first established in the most immediate and intimate connectionwith the conception and interpretation of Being’
While before Plato those two terms, ‘onoma’ and ‘rhema’, referred to all aspects of speaking, encompassing both the linguistic name of the thing (as such, distinguished from the named thing) and the speaking of a word — the action (which, later, was exclusively conceived as ‘rhema’), ‘Plato provides the first interpretation and foundation of the distinction… [and] proceeds from a general characterization of the function of words. “Onoma” in the wider sense is “deloma tei phonei peri ten ousian”: a revelation by means of sound in relation to and in the sphere of the Being of beings.’ [89]
Concerning the specific association between onoma, rhema, and the sphere of beings with respect to our possible dispositions with them (in the sense of: 1. the things we have something to do with — in Greek pragma; 2. our doing and acting in the broadest sense — in Greek praxis)[90], we may have beings as ‘deloma pragmatos (onoma)’, that is ‘a manifestation of things’; and beings as ‘deloma praxeos (rhema)’, that is ‘a manifestation of doing’. When a construction weaves both together (that is when a construction puts together the name referred to a thing and the verb or action direct to that thing), there is ‘the shortest and (at the same time) the first (real) discourse’, in Greek: ‘logos elachistos te kai protos’.[91] I would like to draw your attention to the introduction of the term ‘logos’, which in its primordial sense means ‘putting together’ or ‘gathering separated parts’. This concept is essential not only for Heidegger’s interpretation of Being, but also for the interpretation of the concept of place that I am arguing for here. It seems to me there is a semantic affinity between the Greek ‘logos’ and the Latin ‘locus’ — Italian ‘luogo’ —, which means ‘place’; I will return to this question later to demonstrate that the two meanings are closely connected.
Chapter Two — Section B.2.b. ‘Enklisis’ and ‘ptosis’ as based on the Greek understanding of Being as constancy
We are discussing the ‘modus infinitivus’ of the verb (that is, ‘to be’); this implies the existence of a ‘modus finitus’, or, as Heidegger puts it, ‘a mode of limitedness and definiteness in verbal meaning.’[92] Heidegger asks: ‘what is the Greek prototype for this distinction?’[93] This passage is crucial because it revisits the question of the distinction between different linguistic forms, which is linked to the question of wavering between the possibilities of Being or not-Being, introduced in Chapter One — Section E.5. The wavering of beings between Being and the possibility of not-Being — thereby connecting the question of language to the question of Being (as anticipated above, the two questions were first elaborated together by Plato in the Sophist. In the case of language, the verbal and nominal expression of this ‘wavering’ between different possibilities (modes for verbs, and cases for nouns), was designated in Greek by the terms ‘enklisis’ and ‘ptosis’. Initially, ‘ptosis’ referred to any kind of inflection or deviation for both nouns and verbs; later, when the differences between these forms were clarified, the inflection of the noun was called ‘ptosis’ (or ‘casus’ in Latin), while the inflection of the verb was called ‘enklisis’ (or ‘declinatio’ in Latin).[94] These passages are crucial for understanding the relation between Being and language: we are discussing that ‘ptosis’ and ‘enklisis’ are deviations from the principal part of words and verbs, literally meaning ‘a falling, tipping or inclining. This implies a dripping-off from an upright, straight stance’.[95] Heidegger elucidates this question in the following section:
Chapter Two — Section B.2.b.i. Standing and phusis
The passage we have just mentioned here and the following are crucial for understanding the connection between the forms of language (as we have introduced them so far) and the original Greek interpretation of Being. After having said that ‘inclining… implies a dripping-off from an upright, straight stance’, Heidegger continues: ‘this standing-there, this taking and maintaining a stand that stands erected high in itself, is what the Greeks understood as Being.’[96]
Image 05: Even if the column present-at-hand in Aquileia is a real being, the image suggests the conceptualization concerning the ‘wavering’ of a being (i.e., the Roman column in the picture) between ‘Being’ and ‘not-Being’: Being, as taking and maintaining a stand — an event which is eventually actualized and concretized within the limits of the erected column existing on-site; not-Being, as a possibility for Being — an ‘inclination’, or an ‘enklisis’ from a linguistic perspective; this is an alternative to its actual/present state, an event for which actualization would mean a falling column.
standing-there [as] taking and maintaining a stand that stands erected high in itself, is what the Greeks understood as Being
Heidegger now introduces another crucial concept, the ‘limit’, or ‘peras’ in Greek, which is essential for understanding the concept of ‘Being’ and, I argue, the concept of place, moving beyond modernity’s false assumptions, an issue I will address shortly after summarizing this important section. According to Heidegger, ‘Whatever takes such a stand becomes “constant” in itself and thereby freely and on its own runs up against the necessity of its limit, “peras”. This “peras” is not something that first accrues to a being from outside. Much less is it some deficiency in the sense of a detrimental restriction. Instead, the self-restraining hold that comes from a limit, the having-of-itself wherein the constant holds itself, is the Being of beings; it is what first makes a being be a being as opposed to a nonbeing.’[97]
‘the self-restraining hold that comes from a limit [peras], the having-of-itself wherein the constant holds itself, is the Being of beings; it is what first makes a being be a being as opposed to a nonbeing
This occasion also marks Heidegger’s introduction of other crucial philosophical concepts, which sparked numerous debates throughout Western thought, particularly regarding status and agency (internal? External?), form, appearance, and presence of physical bodies, if not the entire Cosmos; I’m speaking of the concepts of ‘telos’, ‘entelecheia’, ‘morphe’, ‘eidos or idea’, and ‘ousia’, which are connected in a logical chain of reasoning based on the concept of limit — ‘peras’. In this lengthy crucial passage, Heidegger explains how ‘peras’, ‘telos’, ‘entelecheia’, ‘morphe’, ‘eidos-idea’, ‘ousia’ and the question of ‘Being’ are interconnected, stating that a limit is what initially distinguishes a being from a non-being.
Let’s see how Heidegger relates ‘peras’, ‘telos’, ‘entelecheia’, ‘morphe’, ‘eidos-idea’, ‘ousia’ and the question of ‘Being’:
‘For something to take such a stand therefore means for it to attain its limit, to de-limit itself. Thus a basic characteristic of a being is its “telos”, which does not mean goal or purpose, but end. Here “end” does not have any negative sense, as if “end” meant that something can go no further, that it breaks down and gives out. Instead, “end” means completion in the sense of coming to fulfillment <Vollendung >. Limit and end are that whereby beings first begin to “be”. This is the key to understanding the highest term that Aristotle used for Being: “entelecheia”, something’s holding-(or maintaining)-itself-in-its-completion-(or limit). What was done with the term “entelechy” by later philosophy (cf. Leibniz), not to mention biology, demonstrates the full extent of the decline from what is Greek. Whatever places itself into and thereby enacts its limit, and thus stands, has form, “morphe”. The essence of form, as understood by the Greeks, comes from the emergent placing-itself-forth-into-the-limit. But from an observer’s point of view, what stands-there-in-itself becomes what puts itself forth, what offers itself in how it looks. The Greeks call the look of a thing its “eidos” or “idea”. Initially, “eidos” resonates with what we mean when we say that a thing has a face, a visage, that it has the right look, that it stands. The thing “fits.” It rests in its appearing, that is, in the coming-forth of its essence. What grounds and holds together all the determinations of Being we have listed is what the Greeks experienced without question as the meaning of Being, which they called “ousia”, or more fully “parousia”. The usual thoughtlessness translates “ousia” as “substance” and thereby misses its sense entirely. In German, we have an appropriate expression for “parousia” in our word “An-wesen” (coming-to-presence). We use “Anwesen” as a name for a self-contained farm or homestead. In Aristotle’s times, too, “ousia” was still used in this sense as well as in its meaning as a basic philosophical word. Something comes to presence. It stands in itself and thus puts itself forth. It is. For the Greeks, “Being” fundamentally means presence.’ [98]
Something comes to presence. It stands in itself and thus puts itself forth. It is. For the Greeks, ‘Being’ fundamentally means presence.
Nature and Language: changing the meaning of concepts
Before continuing with Heidegger’s decisive passage, let’s make one important observation. I would like to draw your attention to the concepts of ‘idea’ and ‘substance’, which have significantly influenced the development of philosophy and physics (as discussed in my forthcoming article: The Concepts of Place, Space, Matter and the Nature of Physical Existence). It’s worth noting how our modern understanding of these concepts has completely diverged from their original Greek meanings, conveyed through the words ‘eidos’ and ‘ousia’. Furthermore, this shift in meaning has led to a dualistic understanding of nature, where we’ve separated the Being of beings into ‘idea’ as an immaterial entity (a mental or subjective construct, that is, a meaning not aligned with Heidegger’s perspective) and ‘substance’, as a material entity (a product of nature, something objective, which is a meaning differing from the original Greek understanding of ‘ousia’). We have fragmented the unity of nature, the original phusis, into parts, making it impossible to reconstruct it since we have altered the meanings of the original words and concepts, such as ‘eidos’ and ‘ousia’, that gave it sense. This same reversal of meanings occurred earlier with the concept of place and later with space. Our modern struggle to establish a genuine relationship with nature stems from our misguided connection with language, which is the human way to belong to nature as an integral part of it, rather than above or apart from it, as it seems from Heidegger’s reading in this particular circumstance (although I generally share Heidegger’s perspective on Being as discussed in Introduction to Metaphysics, I completely disagree with his questionable, not to say unacceptable, assertions about the metaphysical value of a people. I realign with Heidegger’s revised views on the human-nature relationship as discussed in Letter on Humanism, published in 1947). Let’s revisit Heidegger’s section on on ‘standing’ and ‘phusis’.
The chain of logical passages, starting with the concept of ‘limit’ (peras) and proceeding through ‘telos’, ‘entelecheia’, ‘morphe’, ‘eidos’, and ‘ousia’, ultimately returns to the meaning of Being (and beings) as ‘phusis’. Heidegger states that ‘What we have said helps us to understand the Greek interpretation of Being that we mentioned at the beginning, in our explication of the term “metaphysics”—that is, the apprehension of Being as phusis. The later concepts of “nature,” we said, must be held at a distance from this: “phusis” means the emergent self-upraising, the self-unfolding that abides in itself. In this sway, rest and movement are closed and opened up from an originary unity. This sway is the overwhelming coming-to-presence that has not yet been surmounted in thinking, and within which “that which” comes to presence essentially unfolds as beings. But this sway first steps forth from concealment—that is, in Greek, “aletheia” (unconcealment) happens—insofar as the sway struggles itself forth as a world. Through world, beings first come into being.’[99]
‘phusis’ means the emergent self-upraising [i.e., sway], the self-unfolding that abides in itself. This sway is the overwhelming coming-to-presence… within which “that which” comes to presence essentially unfolds as beings. But this sway first steps forth from concealment — that is, in Greek, “aletheia” (unconcealment) happens
There are a couple of terms that deserve special attention here, which will lead Heidegger to the next sections on the elucidation of Being: specifically, the concepts of ‘sway’ and ‘unconcealment’ (aletheia), both related to the event of Being and its unfolding as beings, i.e., ‘phusis’ according to Heidegger. Phusis is also characterized as ‘the emergent self-upraising, the self-unfolding that abides in itself’, while the expression ‘the sway’, as used by Heidegger, specifically denotes the ‘powerful upsurge of the presence of beings’.[100]
‘Aletheia’ and ‘standing’ as processuality of Place; place and the Being of beings as presence
Let’s take another brief pause to discuss how Heidegger’s concepts in Section B.2.b.i clarify the original notion of phusis. The concepts of standing and phusis relate to the revised notion of place that I am arguing for at RSaP. A revised notion in the sense I am discussing can be seen as the foundation for building a new understanding of nature that recovers the original sense of phusis. The concept of ‘unconcealment’ (aletheia) is very important to this question. What is the relationship between ‘unconcealment’ and place? What is it that is initially concealed, obscured, and then brought to light, emerging as place? Processes. How can the processes that sustain the structure of place be brought to light? By means of limits: ultimately, it is through limits that places appear and remain present standing within those limits. It is through limits that processes become actual in the guise of places. Just as Heidegger argues that limits enable Being to emerge from concealment and persist, I argue that limits allow place to emerge (to be visible) and persist (they remain visible). Being, for Heidegger, and place, for me, mean ‘presence’ within limits. In my articles Limit Place Appearance, and The Place of a Thing, I have specifically explored the concept of ‘limit’ and ‘aletheia’ as placial events that facilitate the disclosure of beings as ‘standing’ in place, thereby constituting ‘presence’ (I understand ‘aletheia’ as the unconcealment of processes, including physicochemical, biological, social, and symbolic ones, that sustain the structure of Being as place. While I specifically addressed the question of the existence of beings, in terms of ‘presence’ as a placial modality of ‘standing’ and ‘appearance’, in the article Body Place Existence: Phenomenology of Cristiano Ronaldo.
The concepts of ‘sway’, and, indirectly, that of ‘unconcealment’ (aletheia) introduce us to the next Section:
Chapter Two — Section B.2.b.ii. Polemos and phusis
I’ve referred to it as indirectly in relation to the concept ‘aletheia’, because from now on, we should bear in mind this modality of Being, which is always present, even if it’s not explicitly mentioned in the event of Being. Being can only emerge if ‘something’ is taken to the light — this is the sense of unconcealment, or ‘aletheia’. Heidegger explores the modalities by which this ‘something’ is brought to light, specifically the modalities of war, confrontation, and struggle, — ‘polemos’ in Greek —, which relate to the concept of ‘the sway’ as characteristic of phusis or Being. Heidegger introduces this question by quoting Heraclitus (fragment 53).[101] According to Heidegger, that fragment says that without struggle, or confrontation, there can be no Being and that it is such a struggle, or confrontation, that preserves Being. The ‘polemos’ mentioned in the fragment ‘is a strife that holds sway before everything divine and human.’[102] Essentially, it is a metaphysical concept that represents an original struggle related to Being, which exists before it degenerates into beings: ‘struggle first and foremost allows what essentially unfolds to step apart in opposition, first allows position and status and rank to establish themselves in coming to presence. In such a stepping apart, clefts, intervals, distances, and joints open themselves up. In con-frontation, world comes to be. [Confrontation does not divide unity, much less destroy it. It builds unity; it is the gathering (logos). “Polemos” and “logos” are the same.’[103]
Confrontation does not divide unity, much less destroy it. It builds unity; it is the gathering (‘logos’). ‘Polemos’ and ‘logos’ are the same.
In the following section, Chapter Two — Section B.2.b.iii. The degeneration of phusis, we see how that original struggle degenerates from Being to mere beings-as-objects—the present-at-hand: ‘Struggle as such not only allows for arising and standing-forth; it alone also preserves beings in their constancy. Where struggle ceases, beings indeed do not disappear… Beings now become just something one comes across; they are findings. What is completed is no longer that which is pressed into limits [that is, set into its form] but is now merely what is finished and as such is at the disposal of just anybody, the present-at-hand… Beings become objects, whether for observing (view, picture) or for making, as the fabricated, the object of calculation. That which originarily holds sway, “phusis”, now degenerates into a prototype for reproduction and copying... The originarily emergent self-upraising of the violent forces of what holds sway, the “phainesthai” as appearing in the broad sense of the epiphany of a world, now becomes reduced to the demonstrable visibility of present-at-hand things.’[104]
Following Heidegger, let’s summarize where we stand now regarding the question of Being and language, after considering these important passages. Being is ‘constancy’ in the twofold sense of ‘phusis’ (standing-in-itself as arising and standing forth) and ‘ousia’ (the ‘enduringly, abiding’); when the originary struggle that allows Being to emerge ceases, the event of Being is finally reduced to the visibility of beings so that the original ‘standing upright’ of Being becomes the visible standing of beings as opposed to the ‘inclining’ possibility of their not-Being. This condition (‘wavering’) is determined in language by the terms ‘ptosis’ and ‘enklisis’. There is a superposition between the condition of beings and their linguistic definition through words, since it is language that enables beings to take a stand. Then, in the end, beings and language, in the form of written words (language is a being among beings), are both an optical question, they are analyzed ‘optically’. In this regard, Heidegger says: ‘In writing what is spoken comes to a stand. Language “is”— that is, it stands in the written image of the word, in the written signs, in the letters, “grammata”… The standard way of examining language is still the grammatical way. Among words and their forms, it finds some that are deviations, inflections of the basic forms.’ [105]
In writing what is spoken comes to a stand
The question regarding the relation between Being and language from a grammatical point of view (which, we have seen, is ‘the standard way of examining language’) is further analyzed in the next section.
Chapter Two — Section B.3. ‘Modus infinitivus’ and ‘enklisis aparemphatikos’
The basic elements of language are nouns and verbs; we have already seen that among words and their forms some are ‘basic forms’, others are inflections or deviations. The basic position for nouns, or substantives, is the nominative singular, with other positions being inflections, such as genitive, accusative, vocative, and plural; the Greek term for these inflections is ‘ptosis’. The basic position for verbs is the first person singular, present indicative, whereas other forms, such as the infinitive, represent a specific modus verbi, an ‘enklisis’ in Greek. Heidegger provides examples of deviations in verbs, such as the Greek verb ‘lego’ , which means ‘I say’ in its basic form (first person singular, present indicative), and ‘lexainto’, which means ‘they (the men, in this case) could be called and addressed.’[106] Analyzing the two verbal forms, lego and lexainto, reveals differences in person (first instead of third), number (singular instead of plural), voice (active instead of passive), tense (present instead of aorist), and mood (indicative instead of optative). ‘Lego’ describes an action that is currently happening or existing, whereas ‘leixanto’ describes a possibility that has not yet been realized and is not currently present. To generalize: ‘The inflected form of the word makes all of this manifest in addition and lets it be understood immediately.’[107] When the word is ‘actual’, it stands ‘straight’; when it’s possible, it ‘inclines’ to the side (This is the function of the “enklisis”, in which the word that stands straight inclines to the side’).[108] The ‘enklisis’ brings different possibilities to light, making them manifest; an inflected form reveals possibilities associated with that inflection, they appear with it. ‘To make something manifest’, ‘to appear with’, in Greek is ‘paremphaino’; the modality expressed by the ‘enklisis’, according to which ‘the word that stands straight inclines to the side’ is therefore called ‘enklisis paremphatikos’.
At this point in the text, Heidegger takes a detour to clarify the meaning of ‘paremphaino’, which I will follow because it may provide valuable insights into the event of Being and its connection to language, beyond its connection to questions of place and space. Again, this is considered from the perspective of Heidegger’s interpretation of the Greek originary experience (a perspective that I largely accept as valid and use as a starting point to develop my revised interpretation of spatial notions and their metaphysical foundations).
the meaning of ‘paremphaino’, as used by Plato in the Timaeus, might offer some important insights into the event of Being, its connection with language, and with questions of place and space
The term ‘paremphaino’ was used by Plato (Timaeus 50e) in an important context — Heidegger observes: ‘The question here is the essence of the becoming of what becomes. Becoming means: coming to Being.’[109] Concerning ‘becoming’ ‘Plato distinguishes 3 things: 1)… that which becomes; 2)… that “within which” it becomes, [that is] the medium in which something builds itself up while it is becoming and from which it then stands forth once it has become; 3)… the source from which what becomes takes the standard of resemblance’.[110] The second sense of ‘paremphaino’ — ‘that within which something becomes’, that is ‘the medium’ — is what we usually call ‘space’, Heidegger says. He then proposes a passage that I have often partially quoted in other articles to highlight the fact that our conception of space differs from the Greek understanding of reality as a spatial fact; as Heidegger himself puts it: ‘The Greeks have no word for “space”. This is no accident, for they do not experience the spatial according to “extensio” but instead according to place (“topos”) as “chōra”, which means neither place nor space but what is taken up and occupied by what stands there. The place belongs to the thing itself. The various things each have their place. That which becomes is set into this placelike “space” and is set forth from it. But in order for this to be possible, “space” must be bare of all the modes of appearance, any modes that it may receive from anywhere.’ [111]
The Greeks have no word for ‘space.’ This is no accident, for they do not experience the spatial according to ‘extensio’ but instead according to place (topos) as ‘chōra’, which means neither place nor space but what is taken up and occupied by what stands there
Heidegger continues his discourse by referring directly to a passage in the Timaeus: ‘For if it were like any one of the modes of appearance that enter into it, then in receiving forms, some opposed in essence to it, some of an entirely other essence, it would allow a bad actualization of the prototype to come to stand, for it would make manifest its own appearance in addition. That wherein the things that are becoming are set must precisely not proffer its own look and its own appearance. [The reference to the Timaeus passage not only intends to clarify the correlation of “paremphainon” and “on,” of appearing-with and of Being as constancy, but also tries to intimate that Platonic philosophy — that is, the interpretation of Being as idea — prepared the transfiguration of place (“topos”) and of “chōra”, the essence of which we have barely grasped, into “space” as defined by extension. Might not “chōra” mean: that which separates itself from every particular, that which withdraws, and in this way admits and “makes room” precisely for something else?]’. [112]
The Place (or Space? or Chōra?) of Being and Language
If we connect these passages with those examined in the previous sections (Section B.2.b. and Section B.2.b.i especially), we realize that the constitutive event of Being (emerging, unfolding, gathering, abiding, standing-there, etc.) and how the event of Being can be expressed by analogy with language surmount each other: the event of Being requires a place (or space, as some would put it) to stand and maintain that stand. By analogy, language affords words the possibility for standing erected high in themselves through the basic position of nouns — the nominative singular — or verbs — the first person present indicative. In the aforementioned quotation by Heidegger, the ambiguity concerning the use of spatial expressions — place as chōra, space — to account for the Being of beings is intrinsic to Heidegger’s vocabulary. Furthermore, I consider the expression ‘placelike space’ a backflip without the safety net — I would have just used the term ‘place’, which, for me, can be the representation of both actual and potential extensive domains; a domain, the actual or potental, established each time by the context; in this way, the region-as-place can vary from the most abstract and generic to the most concrete and specific, from potential to actual, from becoming to being or vice versa. Other than offering a stand for Being, place (or space) offers the alternative possibility for not-Being in that stand (therefore, an alternative place or space is available): this ‘not-Being’ we should intend as an alternative possibility, in the sense of potentiality for coming into (actual) Being. By analogy, language provides words with an alternative place (or space) — in the sense of position to say it with Heidegger — with respect to their standing upright, their basic position; that is, language offers words the place (or space) for ‘inclining to the side’, an inflection with respect to their basic positions known as ‘ptosis’ and ‘enklisis’. This place (or space) — the attempt is made by Heidegger to solve this placial/spatial ambiguity introducing the other neither-spatial-nor-placial term: ‘chōra’ — is, per sé, devoid of any actual characterization but is available for characterization (otherwise there would be no place, or space, and no Being at all, not even as a possibility). This alternative place (or space) is a domain of potentiality, a mode of abstraction, in the end; an abstraction from what is definite and actual — that is, on a spatial/placial level, this potential place/space or ‘chōra’ for Being represents what the ‘modus in-finitivus’ as ‘enklisis’ represents, on a linguistic level, for verbs: there is a correspondence or complementarity between the two levels—the spatial, or placial, and the linguistic. To conclude, Heidegger’s detour was useful to show how questions of space and place are intimately related to the question of Being and the question of language. In this regard, it might be useful to recall what Heidegger has said by introducing the argument of Being from a linguistic perspective, in the Section B.2.a: the first analysis of language was done by Plato and it was ‘worked out and first established in the most immediate and intimate connection with the conception and interpretation of Being’.[113] Through my work as a practicing architect with an interest in theoretical research on spatiality, I aim to explore the connection between the sense of place, space, Being, and language, recognizing that both architectural projects and writings are ultimately forms of language.
Following this important detour, Heidegger returns to the question of language and the different modes of verbs. Having considered the main verbal form ‘lego’ and one possible inflection, ‘lexainto’, he proceeds to analyze the infinitive ‘legein’, meaning ‘to say’. Unlike the other verbal forms examined, this particular form of inflection does not manifest person, number, voice, tense, or mood; instead, it is almost opposite to what was termed ‘enklisis paremphatikos’, where the inflected form reveals all (person, number, tense…). This is why it is called ‘enklisis a-paremphatikos’, which the Roman grammarians inaccurately translated as modus ‘in-finitivus’, as Heidegger notes (Chapter Two — Section B.3.b. The inadequacy of the translation “in-finitivus”). Why inadequate? Because the original Greek sense behind that expression ‘which refers to the look of a thing and the self-manifestation of what stands in itself or inclines itself, has vanished — Heidegger says. Now the determining factor is the merely formal notion of limitation.’[114] In this way, the meaning of the Latin expression modus infinitivus has been ‘pulled away (abstracted) from all definite relations of meaning.’[115]
Chapter Two — Section B.4. The infinitive as abstract and blurred
The infinitive is an abstract verbal concept: it is generic; as Heidegger says: ‘There is a deficiency, a lack, in the infinitive, in its word form and its manner of meaning. The infinitive “no longer” makes manifest what the verb otherwise reveals.’[116] The problematic indeterminacy of this form of verbal abstraction is still augmented if we refer to it as a ‘verbal substantive’ in speaking. When we use this form in speaking, the article in front of the infinitive form (the original reference is to German ‘das’ in the expression ‘das Sein’ — or even, to the Italian abbreviated article ‘l’ in the expression ‘l’essere’, that is, literally ‘the to be’) which is originally a demonstrative pronoun, implies that what is named so itself ‘is’. In this way ‘Being now itself becomes something that “is,” whereas obviously only beings are, and it is not the case that Being also is…. Can it still be any wonder to us now that “Being” is so empty a word when the word form itself is based on an emptying of meaning…?’[117]
only beings are… it is not the case that Being also is… Can it still be any wonder to us now that ‘Being’ is so empty a word…?
So, the next step for Heidegger in order to elucidate the meaning of Being is to see if Being can be understood through some finite forms of the infinitive ‘to be’.
Chapter Two — Section B.5. An attempt to understand Being through finite forms of the verb
In this final section concerning the grammatical analysis of the word ‘Being’, Heidegger focuses on some of its definite forms: I am, You are, He/She/It is, We are… Concerning the first person singular, we say ‘I am’: there is not a ‘Being-entity’ and an ‘I-entity’: the entity is one and that entity is me — my Being, that is: I am. It seems there is a superposition between ‘I’ and the ‘Being’, between being and Being: What does Being consist of, and where is it situated? Heidegger asks. Similar problems we have regarding the other definite forms, or even with respect to those forms in different tenses (I was, We were…), so that Heidegger concludes: ‘The examination of the “definite” verbal forms of “to be” yields the opposite of an elucidation of Being.’[118] Finally, another difficulty emerges: by the analysis of the infinitive mode ‘to be’ and some of its definite forms ‘I am’, ‘I was’, ‘I’ve been’, we see that there are different stems of the word ‘to be’. Here we are entering the next phase of the linguistic analysis concerning the word ‘Being’: its etymology. This is the subject of the following section.
Chapter Two — Section C. The etymology of the Word ‘Being’
Differently from the previous grammatical analysis of the word Being (which was quite extensive), this section concerning the etymology of Being is quite short and synthetic. Concerning the different inflections of the verb ‘to be’ — Heidegger notes — they are all determined by three different stems: ‘1. The oldest and authentic stem word is “es”, Sanskrit “asus”, life, the living, that which from out of itself and in itself stands and goes and reposes: the self-standing. To this stem belong the Sanskrit verb forms “esmi”, “esi”, “esti”, “asmi”. To these correspond the Greek “eimi” and “einai” and the Latin “esum” and “esse”… 2. The other Indo-Germanic root is “bhu”, “bheu”. To this belongs the Greek “phuo”, to emerge, to hold sway, to come to a stand from out of itself and to remain standing. Until now, “bhu” has been interpreted according to the usual superficial conception of “phusis” and “phuein” as nature and as “growing.” According to the more originary interpretation, which stems from the confrontation with the inception of Greek philosophy, this “growing” proves to be an emerging which in turn is determined by coming to presence and appearing. Recently, the radical “phu” has been connected with “pha”, “phainesthai” <to show itself >. “Phusis” would then be that which emerges into the light, “phuein”, to illuminate, to shine forth and therefore to appear… From this same stem comes the Latin perfect “fui”, “fuo”, as well as our German “bin”, “bist”… 3. The third stem appears only in the inflection of the German verb “sein”: “wes”; Sanskrit: “vasami”; Germanic: “wesan”, to dwell, to abide, to sojourn’.[119]
Heidegger summarizes this brief etymological survey, associating three definite meanings with the three stems: 1. Living, 2. Emerging, and 3. Abiding. Therefore, what results from this survey is that these initial meanings are not traceable anymore in the word ‘Being’, and that ‘only an “abstract” meaning, “to be”, has survived’.[120]
Returning to the initial question, ‘Why are there beings at all instead of nothing?’, we have seen that it also echoes the prior question of Being. Despite the linguistic analysis of the word ‘Being’ and the infinitive mode ‘to be’, we have once again realized the difficulty inherent in these words even though ‘we are incessantly engaged by beings, related to beings, and we know ourselves “as beings”.[121] So, ‘“Being” now just counts as the sound of a word for us, a used-up term’. [122] The final section of Chapter Two provides a comprehensive summary of the findings from the grammatical and etymological analyses of the word ‘Being’:
Chapter Two — Section D. Summary
The grammatical analysis of the word ‘Being’ reveals a blurred meaning, resulting from the progressive abstraction of basic or definite verbal modes, such as, for instance, the present indicative and past. This abstraction leads to the infinitive mode ‘to be’ and its further degeneration into the verbal substantive ‘Being’. According to Heidegger: ‘The grammatical examination of the form of the word had this result: in the infinitive, the word’s definite modes of meaning are no longer in effect; they are blurred. The substantivization completely fixes and objectifies this blurring. The word becomes a name for something indefinite’.[123]
The etymological analysis reveals a blended meaning that levels off three original stem meanings: living, emerging, and abiding. This is Heidegger: ‘The etymological examination of the meaning of the word had this result: what we today, and for a long time previously, have called by the name “Being” is, as regards its meaning, a blending that levels off three different stem meanings. None of these is evident definitively and on its own within the meaning of the word anymore.’[124]
The linguistic analysis of the word ‘Being’ reveals a blurred meaning (resulting from the progressive abstractions of basic modes leading to the infinitive mode – to be – and to its degeneration into the verbal substantive – Being), and a blended meaning (which levels off the three stem meanings – living, emerging, abiding – of the verb ‘to be’)
Heidegger concludes: ‘This blurring and blending go hand in hand. The combination of these two processes provides a sufficient explanation for the fact from which we set out: that the word “to be” is empty and its meaning is evanescent.’[125]
Chapter Three: The Question of the Essence of Being
Chapter Three aims to explore the relationship between Being and beings, moving beyond the apparent impasse created by linguistic analysis: can the meaning of One (Being) be derived from the other (being)? How?
Chapter — Three Section A. The priority of Being over beings
Our study of the expression ‘to be’ has shown that language creates ‘infinitives’, and, over time, ‘verbal substantives’, which lead to the erosion of definite verbal modes into ‘indefinite’, generic ones. According to Heidegger, this seemingly negative situation can be turned around if we consider that the generic concept of Being can encompass the specific beings it includes: ‘the meaning of the word “Being” is the emptiest and thus embraces everything’, Heidegger says.[126] Is there an alternative to this situation? Can we shift our focus away from the generic concept of Being and instead examine particular beings, allowing their unique meanings to guide us towards a deeper understanding of Being and filling its emptiness? This is the direction, now: ‘Away from the empty, universal word “Being,” toward the special characteristics of the particular domains of beings themselves!’, Heidegger declares.[127] He lists the kinds of special beings that can be useful for our attempt: mountains, trees, the moon, the cathedral of Strasbourg… which we have already mentioned. However, this is not the correct approach, quite the contrary! ‘… how are we to determine that something that is presumed to be, at some place and time, is not—unless we can dearly distinguish in advance between Being and not-Being?’[128] We must know in advance what the Being of a thing is to discern it from what that thing is not (‘not-Being’). This implies that Being is presupposed in every identification of a specific being, as we can differentiate it from not-Being (Chapter — Three Section A.1. Being as presupposed by every identification of a being as such). However, this seems to contradict our previous linguistic analysis, which suggested that Being is indeterminate. Yet, as Heidegger notes, despite its blurred and universal meaning, we still convey something definite when we refer to Being versus not-Being.[129] At the same time, Being is both the most universal and the most unique of all, since its universality enables us to distinguish any particular beings (Chapter — Three Section Section A.2. The “universality” of Being and its uniqueness). To understand the relationship between Being and beings, Heidegger uses the example of a tree: ‘How are we supposed to discover the much-invoked particular, the individual trees as such […] unless the representation of what a tree is in general is already lighting our way in advance?’[130] Otherwise, we could take the tree for a rabbit or a car, Heidegger says. Heidegger indirectly invokes an important principle of complementarity between the universal (Being) and the particular (beings): ‘Even though it may be correct that in order to determine more precisely the essential multiplicity of the essence “tree,” we must go through the particular, it remains at least equally correct that the illumination of the essential multiplicity and of the essence takes hold and progresses only when we conceive and know more originally the universal essence “tree,” and this then means the essence “plant,” and this means the essence “living thing” and “life”.’[131]
Heidegger draws some conclusions, in the following section:
Chapter — Three Section A.3. Being as higher than all facts
Being is higher than all facts (‘our representing can no longer rise from it to anything higher, since it is, after all, the most universal meaning’),[132] and it is not derivable from other beings, as its genus is different from that of beings; indeed, Heidegger questions whether the generality of Being can even be considered a genus: ‘it is questionable, to begin with, whether the generality of Being is that of a genus… Consequently, it remains questionable whether an individual being can ever count as an example of Being at all’.[133] Heidegger abandons his strategy announced in the opening part of the section, moving away from the particular and instead embracing the universality of Being (‘we should remain there, and raise the uniqueness of this name and its naming to the level of knowledge’ )[134] to revisit the relationship between Being and language, which, as we will see, reveals the essence of human beings as historical Dasein.
Chapter — Three Section A.4. Being as a precondition for language
The investigation of Being has a new starting point: the newly discovered ‘definite’ character of Being, which distinguishes it from not-Being and contrasts with the ‘indeterminate vapor’, as it seemed from the previous analyses. The distinct characteristic of Being, which we derive from the ability to distinguish Being from not-Being, is not only essential but crucial in establishing all that exists, assigning specific names to things (beings). In fact, without Being, there would be no language at all. Beings as such would no longer be expressible in words, and they could no longer be addressed or discussed. To refer to beings as such requires understanding their Being in advance. If we didn’t understand Being at all, if the word ‘Being’ didn’t even have a fleeting meaning, then there wouldn’t be a single word. We ourselves could never be the ones who speak. We would never be able to be who we are.[135] Without understanding Being in advance (without the ability to distinguish Being from not-Being), we couldn’t name beings, and therefore, we wouldn’t be the beings we are: there would be no Dasein at all. The relation between Being and language reveals the unique character of human beings as historical Dasein. By means of language the Being of human beings precipitates into Dasein:
By means of language the Being of human beings precipitates into Dasein
Image 06: Dasein as condition at the historical juncture between the Being of human beings and language.
‘Human beings are yes- and no-sayers only because they are, in the ground of their essence, sayers, “the sayers”. That is their distinction and also their predicament. It distinguishes them from stone, plant, and animal, but also from the gods. Even if we had a thousand eyes and a thousand ears, a thousand hands and many other senses and organs, if our essence did not stand within the power of language, then all beings would remain closed off to us… for our Dasein, this — that we understand Being, if only in an indefinite way — has the highest rank, insofar as in this, a power announces itself in which the very possibility of the essence of our Dasein [which is always a historical Dasein] is grounded ’.[136]
Through Dasein, we can return to the original source from which the meaning of Being arises, since language determines the essence of beings, especially human beings; therefore, we must persist in questioning Being through language, as this is our only way to reveal its meaning.
Now that the relationship between language and the Being of human beings as Dasein has been clarified, Heidegger will review the analysis of Being discussed so far.
Chapter — Three Section A.5. Review
I will briefly repeat the main points here. Initially, the infinite mode ‘to be’ was analyzed and found to be an almost ‘empty word’. When the definite modes of the verb were worn down into the infinite mode (modus infinitivus) or later into the substantive verb ‘‘Being’, their meanings became blurred. We have seen that Being has the most universal meaning, and to understand Being, we cannot proceed from individual beings to Being (from the particular to the universal). This is because particular beings can only reveal themselves to us if we already have a prior understanding of Being in its essence (‘particular beings can “open themselves up as such” to us only if and when we already understand Being in advance in “its” essence’).[137] The fact that Being has a distinct character, allowing us to distinguish it from not-Being in advance, enables us to establish the domain of existence for individual beings and assign them names through language. By doing so, we understand individual beings themselves and, consequently, understand ourselves as a particular kind of being (Dasein). Once again, we find that language plays a crucial role in understanding the nature of Being and beings: ‘then language must be at stake, here and in general, in a special way’, Heidegger concludes.[138]
The Place of Dasein
The structure of place I’m considering is particularly well-suited to understanding Heidegger’s concept of Dasein as a structure grounded in place, in the sense that place always occurs contextually in relation to the processes within it, including human processes. These processes can either be actualized as specific beings, which are entities shaped by physical, biological, social, and symbolic processes, or remain in a state of universal latency as Being — the most fundamental form of presence, which is also a placial state. I interpret this placial state, which precedes the actualization of specific beings, as the state described by Heidegger when he discusses the basic processes of Being, such as ‘gathering’, ‘emerging’, ‘abiding’, ‘standing forth’… Without the original force behind these processes, no actualization is possible. In this latter case, the processes refer to a universal, potential domain of existence that extends its influence over the domain of actuality. There is a complementarity between the two domains, and it is from their congruity and continuity that we can understand the congruity, continuity and complementarity between Being and beings as the place of processes.
Understanding Dasein as place means that certain processes are in act: identifying beings as biological entities (the place of realized biological processes) is one kind of process, while identifying beings as sociocultural entities (the place of realized sociocultural processes) is another. These latter processes, in turn, include linguistic processes, which is in line with Heidegger’s emphasis on the role of language in shaping our understanding of what it means to be human. I use the term ‘cultural’ in its broadest sense, referring to the unique realm of human existence, which is characterized by intellectual and symbolic aspects, with language being a fundamental component. To illustrate this, consider the images in the article On the Structure of Reality’: a painting, an equation, or a city and its architectures – all of these can be seen as languages, just like poems, hymns, or even the simple statement ‘I am, here’. From this perspective, humans are inherently shaped by a historical sequence of processes, with language playing a crucial role; it is this factor that enables us to reflect on ourselves, our existence, and what it means to be human, as Heidegger believed language holds the key to understanding the meaning of human existence. As such, the expression ‘human Being’ refers to the place where biological, social, and cultural processes overlap in a single, all-encompassing structure-event, with a strong emphasis on the temporal and historical factors that shape this event, which constitutes a unified place for these processes. This place — the Being of human-beings — is the ground-place of biological, social and cultural processes (here stands language and, with it, the possibility to investigate the Being of beings, and human beings, as a particular case). This is the place is of Dasein.
The intriguing question is whether the concept of Dasein as a place (of processes) can be broadened to move beyond the privileged human domain attributed by Heidegger, and instead adopt a more universal character that encompasses physical, biological, and social aspects (referred to animal sociality), which precede the human domain as historical Dasein, characterized by language and the ability to create symbolic domains. I see no obstacles to understanding Dasein as a universal concept, rather than specifically human, as in Heidegger’s perspective; in this alternative, the ‘universal Dasein’ — the ‘to be there’ — recovers its basic meaning of a universal association between Being and Place, where there’s no Being without place or vice versa. In the processual and systemic perspective, the ‘there’ (‘da’) of Dasein becomes part of an infinite and nested chain of ‘standings’ for Being (and beings) that ultimately include what is ‘here’. ‘Here’ and ‘there’, or ‘here( )there’, are terms that define a domain of place, they are ‘placial entities’ or ‘placial terms’. Any process actualized in the form of beings, whether a physical field, a carbon atom, a frog, or otherwise, can be understood as Dasein: a metaphysical and physical condition at a specific historical moment. This understanding has a crucial consequence: it establishes a common underlying foundation – a placial ground, or a shared place – for everything that exists. This shared ground surpasses Heidegger’s anthropocentric perspective. From this common placial perspective, it’s easier to recognize and promote solidarity among beings, acknowledging their shared belonging to nature. As I’ve mentioned elsewhere, this lays the groundwork for a multilevel ontology of beings, which share a common metaphysical foundation and the origin of their differences. As I said elsewhere, we are all places.
Chapter Three — Section B. The essential link between Being and the word
Given that the previous grammatical and etymological analyses of Being were not so helpful, Heidegger concludes that ‘the question of Being is not a matter of grammar and etymology’.[139] Through words, we recreate experiences we’ve had, are having, or could have: thus, language becomes an experience. As Heidegger puts it, the word (language) is ‘a reproduction of the experienced being.’[140] Can we grasp the sense of Being by focusing on words? Let’s explore what Heidegger means through the example of the word ‘clock’. We can distinguish: 1. the ‘form’, or that which is visible and audible; 2. the ‘meaning’ we assign to that form and its sounds, such as the ticking, announcing the passage of an hour, or the alarm, etc.; 3 ‘the thing’ itself, this specific physical clock. While with the earlier analyses we focused on the form (grammar) and on the meaning (etymology), ‘our question of Being has not reached the thing, has not gotten to the point’, Heidegger observes.[141] So, what is the thing behind Being? Heidegger asks: ‘But is “Being” a thing like clocks, houses, or any being at all ?’, and he reminds us that ‘we have run up against this quite enough: Being is not a being, nor any ingredient of beings that is itself in being. The Being of the building over there is not “another” thing of the same sort as the roof and the cellar. Thus no thing corresponds to the word and the meaning “Being”.’[142] However, we cannot even conclude that the word ‘Being’ is merely a label, regardless of its seemingly ephemeral nature, a vapour; this would imply that Being falls into the category of beings, which is not the case. The word Being carries more significance than (other words referring to) beings. Even if ‘the thing’ behind Being is absent, and there is a unique connection between Being ‘the form’ and ‘its meaning’, we cannot extract the essence of Being from them. Nonetheless, Heidegger notes that ‘the question of Being remains intimately linked to the question of the word’, and thus he revisits this issue in the next section C.[143]
no thing corresponds to the word and the meaning ‘Being’
The vacuity of Being versus the plenitude of Place. A Metaphysics of Place
Before moving on to Section C, let me share a couple of considerations I had while reading these specific pages of Introduction to Metaphysics (I initially jotted them down as notes in the margin, and I’ll elaborate on them now). Heidegger’s typical approach is to constantly ask questions, provide tentative answers, and then immediately negate them, which often tested my patience. So, at this point in the text, after numerous questions about what lies behind Being, I provided my answer, taking into account Heidegger’s previous discussion and linking it to my interpretation of place, which I fundamentally understand as the foundation of all existence. This ground inherently encompasses both Being (although, as Heidegger notes, its exact meaning still remains unclear…) and individual beings. It should be clear that beings can be understood as the place of actualized processes, regardless of whether the product of actualization is a physicochemical being, such as a rock or a planet, a biological being, like a tree or a cell, a social being, like a beehive or a football team, or an abstract, potential, or symbolic being, like a dream or a mathematical equation. The question remains, how do we relate Being to place? How can we think about Being as ‘place’? We can start with the hypothesis that beings emerge as the physical, biological, social, and symbolic outcomes of realized (satisfied) processes. When these processes unfold and reach a certain threshold of satisfaction, a being emerges beyond that threshold (a limit or boundary), marking a positive end for those processes, as they are satisfied—I’ve elaborated this, building on Whitehead’s ideas. What happens if processes are not satisfied and fail to surpass the threshold of actualization? If this is the case, it implies that these processes have no end or limit (no boundary…), and they may remain active for further attempts at actualization or be ‘absorbed’ and ‘drawn back’ into the abyss of Nothing. This ground, territory, region, or domain of processes – what is a place if not a ground, a territory, a region, or domain? – serves as the generating and nurturing place for Being before the actualization of beings. According to Heidegger’s statement that ‘no thing corresponds to the word and the meaning “Being”’, we can only hypothesize its structure in connection with those processes that are the breeding ground for the actualization of beings. This does not mean that we can derive Being from beings as a matter of fact; Being is not a fact (it is not a ‘thing’). Rather, it means that the two are connected. How? Heidegger will elaborate on this connection further in the next part of the text, but here, I attempt to anticipate this connection based on the difference between actualized and non-actualized processes. Based on this, I propose that Being is the place of processes (the universal domain of existence). So far, Heidegger has provided us with some instruments to understand what these processes concerning Being are: ‘emerging’, ‘coming into appearance’, ‘taking/maintaining a stand’, ‘unfolding’, ‘gathering’, ‘abiding’, ‘standing forth’ – these are some of the verbs used by Heidegger in connection with the event-Being. He has spoken of ‘emerging sway’, which is the necessary condition for processes to present themselves as the first and originary alternative to no-thing (not-Being). Therefore, the overall processual image/character of place that I’m devising and suggesting is useful for filling the vacuity of Being: imagining Being as the place of processes opposed to and, at the same time, complementary with beings (as the place of actualized processes) is an immediate way to give Being a plenitude of meanings that, otherwise, it still lacks according to Heidegger. Then, I say, this is the relation we are elaborating on: Being( )beings, given that this structure is curved in itself like the mythological ouroboros, the serpent that eats its own tail, a symbol of endless continuity. This structure, curved in on itself, arises from the joint action of two opposing brackets, which represent both unity and multiplicity. This structure is the place of processes, whether they are actualized or not, actual or potential, particular or universal. This ‘One’ (comprised of many) is place. This is the ground. Being emerges as the potentiality for beings to become what they are destined to be, and after they are actualized, it persists in them, having transformed their possibility into a fact. The original sway of Being enables its own existence to emerge from the abyss of Nothing and move towards its realization as beings. This original ‘sway’ and this ‘advance towards’ can help us understand what underlies the concept of ‘polemos’ that Heidegger introduced earlier. The concept of place I evoke, situated between the universal (the place of Being) and the particular (the place of actualized beings), parallels the ideal/physical domain (as such… it is a bastard domain) of existence known as chōra, as described by Plato. Notably, the term ‘domain’ has a natural connection to the term ‘polemos’. My concept of place shares many analogies with Plato’s chōra, but I argue that it is more accessible than ‘chōra’, which remains uncertain after over two millennia of discussion, and more tangible than the abstract notion of Being, which seems so elusive—a vapour. Through place, we give this vapour a ‘sub-stance’ — in the original sense of that which stands behind and sustains (in Greek ‘hupokeimenon’): a ground. In this sense, place is that which precedes all, in that it sustains.
Saying ‘place of processes’ doesn’t imply that processes exist as original forms and then a place emerges where they unfold. Instead, place and processes are intertwined, each shaping the other, forming a unified structure: ‘( )’. So, this is the originary structure we are hypothesizing: place( )processes, or processes( )place, which is the same. The metaphysical complexity of place is more manageable than other concepts, such as Being or chōra, if we move beyond modernity’s false assumptions that fragmented the original structure of place into disconnected notions, including place as a simple location, a geographical notion, or a social notion. Place has certainly many dimensions but the original relation between the different dimensions of place can only be understood by examining its fundamental metaphysical structure.
In summary, Being is the event that allows beings to emerge and reveal themselves, and place is what they need to manifest. Any event is a place of processes. In the unitary relationship Being( )beings co-exist place, processes, and time (which is merely the relation between process durations), as well as actualization and potentiality, becoming and being, the particular and the universal. We can discover the meaning of the Being of beings, — which can be thought of as the place of processes —, in the potentiality of beings and the necessary processual phases for their manifestation. As we’ve learned from Heidegger’s teachings so far, Being is the highest and most complete manifestation of existence, that which is. It is the highest and most complete because, beyond Being, there is nothing; it encompasses the actuality of beings, as well as their potential to become different beings, which includes the capacity for growth, development, decay, change in color, form, and so on, while maintaining their essential determination, or Being. All that exists, in any presence, form, time, or location, along with the inherent agency and processuality, constitutes one overarching structure: place is the event of processes, which can be actualized or potential, and thus encompasses everything that exists. Then, place, apart from being a metaphysical and physical structure, is also a useful metaphor that fills the apparent void of Being and imposes its presence on the ‘vaporous presence’ of Being itself. In my view, this reformed understanding of place makes it easier to comprehend the sense of Being and beings. This is another reason why it could be considered an alternative to Being as the ultimate ground for all existence, given its explanatory power.
Chapter Three — Section C. The inclusion of the various meanings of “is” within the Greek understanding of Being as presence
Heidegger identifies multiple ways of Being, illustrating the various meanings of the verb ‘to be’ through a list of expressions, such as ‘God is… The earth is… The cup is of silver… The book is mine… He is dead… The enemy is in retreat…The dog is in the garden…’.[144] In these examples, the verb ‘is’ conveys multiple meanings, including being actually present, constantly present at hand, taking place, originating from, consisting of, staying, belonging, succumbing to, standing for, coming about, prevailing, entering upon, coming forth, and so on. In this way, Heidegger has demonstrated that the indeterminacy and emptiness of the ‘is’ in itself enable its manifold use, allowing it to fill and determine itself ‘according to the situation’, therefore, Heidegger concludes, ‘Being must be indeterminate in order to be susceptible to determination.’[145] Here, an important passage connects the indeterminate character of Being (the infinitive ‘to be’) to the possible determinations signified by the ‘is’ in the examples; Heidegger states that ‘a definite, unitary trait runs through all these meanings. It points our understanding of “to be” toward a definite horizon by which the understanding is fulfilled. The boundary drawn around the sense of “Being” stays within the sphere of presentness and presence, <Gegenwärtigkeit und Anwesenheit>, subsistence and substance <Bestehen und Bestand>, staying and coming forth.’[146] It is possible to delineate the boundaries of the domain of Being, as something determinate, by means of the following traits: presence, subsistence and substance, staying and coming forth.
it is possible to delineate the boundaries of the domain of Being, as something determinate, by means of the following traits: presence, subsistence and substance, staying and coming forth.
In a certain sense, the domain of Being is both indeterminate and determinate. These new findings align with the directions we have already explored, which are characteristic of ‘the Greek experience and interpretation of Being… the Greek conception of the essence of Being ’.[147]
The universality and particularity of Place, in-between indetermination and determination
Again, I see a perfect alignment between Heidegger’s concept of Being as both indeterminate and determinate and the similar character of place — ‘indeterminate( )determinate’ — that I’m proposing. The traditional view, rooted in Aristotle’s definition, sees place as a defined entity with clear limits (‘place is the first unchangeable limit (peras) of that which surrounds’).[148] This interpretation has led to the notion of place being ultimately reduced to a physical or geographical concept by subsequent interpreters. However, this interpretation overlooks the ‘grounding’ value of place, which, as Edward S. Casey demonstrated, remains present in Aristotle, despite being obscured by the dominant physical aspect of that definition.[149] Thus, Archytas’s original insight (‘it is obvious that one has to grant priority to place; all existing things are either in place or not without place’)[150] appears no longer valid, and Simplicius’s assertion, many centuries later (‘place… pervades everything; for everything that happens is in a place’)[151] fails to restore the original locator power of place (in the metaphysical sense). Despite traditional assumptions about place, the interpretation of the concept of place I am suggesting at RSaP expands its physical meaning — determined by physical limits — to reclaim its original locator power, which is not solely determined by physical limits. In this sense, similarly to Being and beings, place can also be understood as the ‘in-determined’ available to determination. Conceiving Being and beings as the place of processes (universal sense) and actualized processes (particular sense) is another way to illustrate the mutuality between ‘indetermination’ and ‘determination’, both essential to existence: on the one hand, the ‘in-determined’ available to determination, as that which is universal — Being; on the other hand, the ‘determined’, arising from the undetermined, as that which is particular (beings). This mutuality between indeterminate and determinate — ‘indeterminate( )determinate’ — is always active in the case of place, much like Heidegger’s explanation of Being, in the sense that the concept of place is fundamentally a question of ‘presence’ versus absence; when processes are contextually present in their place, they possess a certain degree of determination, distinguishing them from nothingness (not-Being); in a state of potentiality, processes remain active, and their actualization can be seen as a higher level of determination, ultimately leading to the reification of processes into determined forms (actual beings). This can be viewed as a transitional event, where indetermination (Being as a universal process) gives way to determination (realized or actualized processes in a particular sense, resulting in physicochemical, biological, social, or cultural/symbolic beings, which summarize the fundamental and progressive categories of existence: things, life, societies, thought). The threshold or limit between indetermination and determination enables us to distinguish between the realm (place) of processes and the realm (place) of actualized processes. The former relates to Being as the place of processes, while the latter concerns beings as the place of realized processes. The former domain is unrestricted by time contingencies, which aligns with its universal and indeterminate status, whereas the latter domain is restricted or limites, with the duration of processes determining the existence and limits of each being in both spatial and temporal terms.
Turning back to Introduction to Metaphysics, what Heidegger has delineated so far is the preparatory territory for the final Chapter Four, where the structure of Being is finally unveiled. Since the upcoming discussion is as lengthy as the previous three chapters, I have decided to address it in a separate article: Being as Place: Introduction to Metaphysics – Part Two (the Limitation of Being)
Notes
[1] The book An Introduction to Metaphysics holds special importance in the English-speaking world as it was the first book-length work by Heidegger to be translated into English (trans. Ralph Manheim, 1959), three years before the first English publication of Being and Time: in Martin Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Gregory Fried and Richard Polt (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), viii. In this article, I will be referencing the 2000 edition of the book.
[2] The phrase ‘the nature of Being’ is redundant if go beyond the figurative use of nature intended as ‘character’ or ‘characteristic’ intrinsic to something and we strictly adhere to Heidegger’s interpretation of Being, since ‘nature’, derived from the Latin ‘natura’, is a loose translation of the Greek ‘phusis’, which Heidegger equates with Being itself, the essence by which beings become and remain observable. So, ‘the nature of Being’ is equivalent to ‘the Being of Being’, a circular phrase that refers to Being.
[3] Martin Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), x.
[4] Ibid., 80.
[5] Ibid., 80-81.
[6] Ibid., x.
[7] In the edition translated by Ralph Manheim, the phrase rendered by Fried and Polt as ‘Why are there beings [Seiendes] instead of nothing?’ is translated as follows: ‘WHY ARE THERE ESSENTS* rather than nothing?’ The asterisk at the bottom of page 1 of the original 1959-edition, reports the following explanation: ‘“Essents” = “existents,” “things that are.” See Translator’s Note, p.ix.’ In that note, the author, Manheim, explains why he did not use the term ‘beings’ and preferred to coin, ‘essent’, ‘essents’ or ‘the essent’, from the Latin essens, essentis, present participle of the verb sum, (esse = to be); in Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Ralph Manheim(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959), ix.
[8] Ibid., xi.
[9] Ibid., xi.
[10] Ibid., xi.
[11] Ibid., 2-4.
[12] Ibid., 6.
[13] For an in-depth analysis of the Archytian axiom’s meaning and its various formulations, see Edward Casey’s book The Fate of Place or the article Place and Space: A Philosophical History, which is based on Casey’s book. The formula I have used — to be (at all) is to be in (some) place — is the one used by Edward S. Casey in The Fate of Place, page 4. This formulation is a slight modification of Archytas’ original statement, as referred to by Casey and reported by Simplicius: ‘all existing things are in place or not without place’, in Shmuel Sambursky’s The Concept of Place in Late Neoplatonism, page 37 (since there are scant traces and fragments regarding the historical figure of Archytas, Sambursky, at page 14 of his book, refers to that statement as attributed to Archytas ‘but in fact deriving from an unknown Neopythagorean philosopher’ — that’s why he attributes that fragment to ‘Pseudo-Archytas’; this is the complete translation of the fragment appearing in Simplicius’ commentary on Aristotle’s Categories, 361, 21-24: ‘Since everything that is in motion is moved in some place (topos), it is obvious that one has to grant priority to place, in which that which causes motion or is acted upon will be. Perhaps thus it is the first of all things, since all existing things are either in place or not without place’). I have used Casey’s slightly modified version, which aligns with my understanding of place as a concept encompassing both metaphysical and physical connotations. The inclusion of ‘some’ in brackets implies a relational and pluralistic sense of place, closely tied to Aristotle’s original definition of place (topos) in Physics, Book IV. Conversely, by minimizing what appears between brackets and reducing the axiom to its essence— ‘to be is to be in place’ — it may acquire an absolute sense, which, in my opinion, has a more metaphysical connotation. One sense of the axiom does not exclude the other if we think that the two levels – the physical and metaphysical – are distinct yet complementary levels of one and the same reality.
[14] Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, 15. See Section C, where Heidegger speaks about the connection between Being, beings and Phusis:phusis is ‘the fundamental Greek word for beings as such’ understood as ‘the emerging-abiding sway… Phusis is Being itself, by virtue of which beings first become and remain observable.’
[15] The reference is to the essay Building Dwelling Thinking.
[16] I have said ‘for… a duration’ instead of ‘in… time’ to avoid any possible reference to ‘time’ (or duration) as an a priori domain with respect to ‘being’ and ‘place’. Any form of existence is an event simultaneously characterized by ‘being place time-as-duration.’
[17] Ibid., 2.
[18] Ibid., 3.
[19] See the article Back to the Origins of Space and Place, notes [85], [86], [87].
[20] Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, 7.
[21] Martin Heidegger, On the being and conception of φύσις in aristotle’s physics B, 1, translated by Thomas J. Sheehan, in Man and World (9, 3, 1976), 224
[22] Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, 9.
[23] Ibid., 10-11.
[24] Ibid., 12.
[25] Ibid., 12.
[26] Ibid., 13.
[27] Ibid., 14
[28] Ibid., 14
[29] Ibid., 15.
[30] Ibid., 15.
[31] Ibid., 15.
[32] Ibid., 15.
[33] Ibid., 16.
[34] Ibid., 16.
[35] This pictorial expression, — ( ) —, which I sometimes use as a substitute for the more conventional copula ‘and’, suggests that two parts are complementary, with their simultaneous action and appearance defining a unity, much like a system composed of parts. In this case, the fundamental unity of the event we call ‘nature’ results from the interplay between Being and becoming.
[36] Alfred N. Whitehead, Nature and Life (London: Cambridge University Press, 1934), 33.
[37] Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, 15.
[38] For instance, we have already seen the root ‘sta’ may be connected with the Proto-Indo-European verbal root *steh2-, a root on which ‘general words for a place’ are constructed — I have dealt with this question in the articles Back to the Origins of Space and Place and Body Place Existence: Phenomenology of Cristiano Ronaldo, especially.
[39] See the paragraph The Question About the Thing in Kant’s Main Work, in the article What is a Thing?
[40] This means that ‘appearance’ (the result of emergence) or ‘standing forth’ are not exclusive processes of the domain of Being, but also describe the processuality intrinsic to the domain of beings. Both Being and beings come into appearance and stand or persist in that appearance (otherwise they could not exist). In the case of Being, ‘appearance’ is more metaphorical, if by that term we imply visibility, which is an exclusive pertinence of beings (at least of physical beings).
[41] Ibid., 18.
[42] Ibid., 18.
[43] Heidegger, On the Being and Conception of Phusis in Aristotle’s Physics B, 1, 231-235.
[44] Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, 16.
[45] Ibid., 17.
[46] Ibid., 18.
[47] Ibid., 19.
[48] Ibid., 19.
[49] Ibid., 21.
[50] Ibid., 21.
[51] Ibid., 25.
[52] Ibid., 26-27.
[53] Ibid., 27.
[54] Ibid., 27.
[55] Ibid., 28.
[56] Ibid., 28.
[57] Ibid., 30.
[58] Ibid., 31.
[59] Ibid., 32.
[60] Ibid., 35.
[61] Ibid., 31.
[62] Ibid., 32.
[63] Ibid., 33.
[64] Ibid., 33; I will use quotation marks in cases where the original text is written in italics.
[65] Ibid., 34.
[66] Ibid., 34.
[67] Ibid., 35; Heidegger’s original expression ‘Wie steht um das Sein?’ could be translated more colloquially as ‘What is the status of Being?’ or even ‘What about Being?’ the translators say.
[68] Ibid., 38.
[69] Ibid., 38.
[70] Ibid., 39.
[71] Ibid., 47.
[72] Ibid., 47.
[73] Ibid., 52.
[74] Ibid., xii.
[75] Ibid., 48, 49. Here, Heidegger’s critique specifically targets America and Russia, portraying Europe as a passive observer of the ‘disempowering of the spirit’, which he describes as causing ‘growing perplexity and uncertainty of Europe against it’. I have omitted those parts with specific reference to those countries: all I can say, from a 21st-century observer’s perspective, is that those aspects regarding the misinterpretation of the spirit Heidegger speaks about are now widespread, with no geographical or racial distinctions.
[76] Ibid., 52.
[77] Ibid., 53.
[78] Ibid., 54.
[79] Edward S. Casey, The Fate of Place: A Philosophical History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 71.
[80] Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, 56.
[81] Ibid., 57.
[82] Ibid., 58.
[83] Ibid., 58-59.
[84] Ibid., 59.
[85] Ibid., 59.
[86] Ibid., 59.
[87] Ibid., 59.
[88] Ibid., 60.
[89] Ibid., 60-61.
[90] Ibid., 61.
[91] Ibid., 61.
[92] Ibid., 61.
[93] Ibid., 61.
[94] Ibid., 62.
[95] Ibid., 62-63.
[96] Ibid., 63.
[97] Ibid., 63.
[98] Ibid., 63-64.
[99] Ibid., 64.
[100] Ibid., xiii.
[101] According to a note of the translators, this is a conventional translation of Heraclitus’s fragment: ‘War is the father of all and the king of all, and it has shown some as gods and others as human beings, made some slaves and others free’. This is the passage, written by Heidegger, which accompanies the Greek citation by Heraclitus: ‘Confrontation is indeed for all (that comes to presence) the sire (who lets emerge), but (also) for all the preserver that holds sway. For it lets some appear as gods, others as human beings, some it produces (sets forth) as slaves, but others as the free’, page 65.
[102] Ibid., 65.
[103] Ibid., 65.
[104] Ibid., 65-66.
[105] Ibid., 68.
[106] Ibid., 68.
[107] Ibid., 68.
[108] Ibid., 69.
[109] Ibid., 69.
[110] Ibid., 69.
[111] Ibid., 69.
[112] Ibid., 69-70.
[113] Ibid., 60.
[114] Ibid., 71.
[115] Ibid., 71.
[116] Ibid., 71.
[117] Ibid., 73.
[118] Ibid., 73.
[119] Ibid., 74-75.
[120] Ibid., 76.
[121] Ibid., 77.
[122] Ibid., 77.
[123] Ibid., 77-78.
[124] Ibid., 78.
[125] Ibid., 78.
[126] Ibid., 80.
[127] Ibid., 80.
[128] Ibid., 81.
[129] Ibid., 82-83.
[130] Ibid., 84.
[131] Ibid., 84.
[132] Ibid., 85.
[133] Ibid., 85.
[134] Ibid., 85.
[135] Ibid., 86.
[136] Ibid., 86-87.
[137] Ibid., 90.
[138] Ibid., 90.
[139] Ibid., 91.
[140] Ibid., 91.
[141] Ibid., 92.
[142] Ibid., 92.
[143] Ibid., 93.
[144] Ibid., 94.
[145] Ibid., 95.
[146] Ibid., 96.
[147] Ibid., 96.
[148] in Edward S. Casey, The Fate of Place: A Philosophical History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 55.
[149] Ibid., 71: ‘Defined as a bounding container, place in Aristotle’s sure hands takes on a quite dynamic role in the determination of the physical universe. Place indeed “has some power.” It has the power to make things be somewhere and to hold and guard them once they are there. Without place, things would not only fail to be located; they would not even be things: they would have no place to be the things they are. The loss would be ontological and not only cosmological: it would be a loss in a kind of being and not merely in the number of beings that exists.’
[150] See note 13, above
[151] this is the extended quotation: ‘place too, not less than time, pervades everything; for everything that happens is in a place’, in Shmuel Sambursky, The Concept of Place in Late Neoplatonism (Jerusalem: The Israel Academy of Science and Humanity, 1982), 175.
Works Cited
Casey, Edward S. The Fate of Place: A Philosophical History. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997.
Heidegger, Martin. Introduction to Metaphysics.Translated by Gregory Fried, and Richard Polt. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000.
Heidegger, Martin. An Introduction to Metaphysics. Translated by Ralph Manheim. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959.
——. “On the being and conception of φyσiσ in Aristotle’s physics B, 1”, trans. Sheehan, Thomas J., in Man and World (9, 3, 1976), 219-270.
Sambursky, Shmuel. The Concept of Place in Late Neoplatonism. Jerusalem: The Israel Academy of Science and Humanity, 1982.
Whitehead, Alfred N. Nature and Life. London: Cambridge University Press, 1934.
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2 Comments
JE Shirley
Valuable information and a bit of originality, which is very much appreciated. Thank you!
Alessandro Calvi Rollino
You’re welcome.