Take a mountain: is it a thing or a place? It is an elemental thing-place. The mountain looms before us as a massive place for things and as itself a thing. It looms as a Thing of things [i.e., a compound body], just as stones and lichen on stones are in turn things of this Thing. Furthermore, just as suchdeterminate…
In the introductory note to PART IV – PROLEGOMENA TO A NEW CONCEPT OF NATURE of the book The Nature of Physical Existence (1972), the American author, philosopher Ivor Leclerc, remarks on the reason why he developed such an articulated exploration into the conception of nature, i.e., the physical existent (from the Greek term ‘physis’, φύσις), between historical, linguistic, metaphysical…
I argue we cannot understand the meaning of the concepts of place and space, and their impact on our understanding of the nature of reality, without considering the meaning of other basic concepts that are co-implicated with and necessary for understanding the very concepts of place and space. That was particularly evident ever since I introduced Julian Barbour’s scientific history…
To be (at all) is to be in (some) place Archytian Axiom This is how the Archytian axiom is reported by Edward Casey in the book The Fate of Place.[1] That formulation is slightly different from the original Archytas’ statement Casey refers to, as reported by Simplicius – ‘all existing things are in place or not without place’ –, in…