The Archytian Axiom

To be (at all) is to be in (some) place
Archytian Axiom

American philosopher Edward S. Casey reports the Archytian axiom in his book The Fate of Place as follows: ‘… to be (at all) is to be in (some) place.’ ^[1] The original statement by Archytas, as referenced by Simplicius, and reported by Israeli physicist and professor Shmuel Sambursky in The Concept of Place in Late Neoplatonism, is slightly different: ‘all existing things are either in place or not without place.’^[2] I have adopted Casey’s version because it aligns with my understanding of place, encompassing both metaphysical and physical aspects. The phrase ‘some’ in brackets implies a relational and pluralistic sense of place, similar to Aristotle’s definition of place (topos) as ‘the first unchangeable limit (peras) of that which surrounds.’^[3] Conversely, if we distill the axiom to its essence – ‘to be is to be in place’ – it takes on an absolute sense, which, in my opinion, has a more metaphysical connotation. One sense of the concept does not exclude the other if we think of the two levels – the physical and the metaphysical – as complementary.

This position of mine on the Archytian axiom, which integrates physical and metaphysical aspects, is in line with Heidegger’s assertion in his essay ‘On the being and conception of φύσις in aristotle’s physics B, 1’, where he argues that ‘In a quite basic sense, meta-physics is “physics,” i.e., knowledge of “physis”.’ Concerning the usual division attributed to Aristotle’s complete corpus of works, Heidegger contends that, in general, ‘it makes little sense to say that the “Physics” precedes the “Metaphysics” because metaphysics is just as much “physics” as physics is “metaphysics”.’^[4]

Notes

[1] Edward S. Casey, The Fate of Place: A Philosophical History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 4.

[2] Shmuel Sambursky, The Concept of Place in Late Neoplatonism (Jerusalem: The Israel Academy of Science and Humanity, 1982), 37. Since there are scant traces and fragments regarding the historical figure of Archytas, Sambursky, on page 14 of his book, refers to that statement as attributed to Archytas ‘but in fact deriving from an unknown Neopythagorean philosopher’ – that’s why he speaks of ‘Pseudo-Archytas’. This is the complete translation of the fragment appearing in Simplicius’ commentary on Aristotle’s Categories, 361, 21-24: ‘Since everything that is in motion is moved in some place [topos], it is obvious that one has to grant priority to place, in which that which causes motion or is acted upon will be. Perhaps thus it is the first of all things, since all existing things are either in place or not without place.’

[3] Edward S. Casey, The Fate of Place: A Philosophical History, 55. That definition appears in Aristotle’s Physics, Book IV (212a20-21).

[4] Martin Heidegger, On the being and conception of φύσις in aristotle’s physics B, 1, translated by Thomas J. Sheehan, in Man and World (9, 3, 1976), 223, 224.

Works Cited

Casey, Edward S. The Fate of Place: A Philosophical History. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997.

Heidegger, Martin. “On the being and conception of φyσiσ in aristotle’s physics B, 1”, trans. Sheehan, Thomas J., in Man and World (9, 3, 1976), 219-270.

Sambursky, Shmuel. The Concept of Place in Late Neoplatonism. Jerusalem: The Israel Academy of Science and Humanity, 1982.