I would like to further explore the general question of the spatial interpretations of reality, a topic I also addressed in the final part of my article New Realism for Architects, where I argued that we are living in a reality that is completely different from those of past eras—a new reality, properly. This question is particularly relevant not only for architects in their practical activities but also because our understanding of spatiality, as discussed in the transdisciplinary hypothesis at RSaP—Rethinking Space and Place, transcends specific disciplinary boundaries. I hope the following considerations will help clarify key aspects of my discussion on spatiality, including: A) the reasons why we need to rethink space and place; B) differences and similarities between my vision of spatiality* at RSaP and that of influential thinkers like Archytas, Aristotle, Plato, and Heidegger, among others.
* By the term ‘spatiality’ I mean the possibility to describe or explain environmental situations, at any scale, using concepts of space and/or place. For example, Heidegger’s ‘Building Dwelling Thinking’ can be read as an essay on spatiality. In my view, the concept of ‘spatiality’ encompasses two key aspects: firstly, the systemic and processual nature of place, which can be defined as a system of interconnected physicochemical, biological, social, and symbolic processes (this processual aspect incorporates the temporal factor); and secondly, the abstract dimension of space, which is a product of thought—an abstraction or figment of the imagination—useful for synthesizing certain environmental aspects, such as its extension, rather than representing the true physical backdrop of events, bodies, or objects (recent articles—such as The Place of Space and The Place of the Invisible and the Intangible—elucidate this specific question). This spatial framework, organized in this manner, prevents the confusion between concrete and abstract domains, which could have fatal consequences, loosening our understanding of real environmental dynamics. Their distinction can be better understood through an accurate recognition of the ontological and epistemological values of the concepts of place and space (see What Is Place? What Is Space?). Given the hypothesis I am exploring at RSaP, which emphasizes the primary importance of place in understanding environmental dynamics, and the different role of space in relation to traditional spatial narratives, I believe it is more appropriate to refer to ‘placiality’ rather than ‘spatiality’. That is because ‘placiality’ encompasses both the intensive and temporal aspects of reality, in addition to its extensive character that is typically associated with ‘space’, which is why we usually use the term ‘spatiality’.
1. Rethinking Space and Place: Why?
As someone sensitive to the realities of the present day, both as a person and an architect, it is my contention that the interpretation of spatiality attempted by authors in the past, including influential figures like Aristotle, Plato, Descartes, Newton, Einstein, and Heidegger, should not be taken as if their ideas and concepts were frozen abstractions, out of time and cultural contingencies. To truly understand and interpret present-day reality, which is so different from the past, we should avoid being limited by outdated spatial concepts or traditional interpretations; instead, we can use these concepts as a foundation to propose new ideas that align with contemporary scientific discoveries and philosophical thinking, and the sensibilities of our time. Epochs are always distinct, and sensibility, in particular, undergoes constant changes from one generation to the next. When it comes to significant scientific discoveries and their philosophical underpinnings, we should remember Kuhn’s concept of paradigm shifts, which occur only at specific points in history; currently, we are experiencing one of those pivotal moments.[1] The transmission of knowledge often involves changing the meaning of traditional concepts or introducing new ones, as seen in the development of the theory of relativity and quantum mechanics, which surpassed Newtonian mechanics, and earlier, the emergence of modern physical theories and concepts that replaced Aristotelian models and conceptions. Adapting old concepts to explain new phenomena in a radically different reality would be an anachronism, stifling human creativity and intellectual potential, which everybody should offer to his/her own epoch. This approach risks widening the epistemological gap between reality and our understanding of it, with devastating consequences—such as the current ecological and climate crisis, which stems from our limited grasp of nature’s complex and systemic dynamics. We are living in a reality that is fundamentally different from the past, one shaped by classical physics and related scientific discoveries. However, with the advent of new physical laws (relativity and quantum physics) and new scientific disciplines (complexity sciences, including systems theory, cybernetics, chaos theory, self-organization, ecology, computational modeling, etc.) our understanding of nature is changing. This shift necessitates a reevaluation of our traditional models of spatiality (and, connected with it, models of materiality and temporality) as spatial concepts are crucial for humans to understand their relationship with the natural environment and their place within it, which is the central argument I am making at RSaP. If we exclude the domain of contemporary physics, the spatial concepts that we commonly use to refer to phenomena in present-day reality are, in many cases, still anchored to another epoch—the modern epoch shaped by Newtonian concepts and related philosophical underpinnings: mechanism, determinism, and reductivism. This vision of the Cosmos is overly narrow, unrealistic, and driven by a physicalist or materialistic perspective that prioritizes reason and objective, quantitative aspects of reality (scientific materialism) over feelings and qualitative aspects and values (for an architectural version of this debate see The Alexander-Eisenman Debate on the Background of Different Spatial Theories). As the English romantic painter and poet William Blake so eloquently put it: ‘May God us keep from single vision & Newton’s sleep!’[2]
… May God us keep
From Single vision & Newton’s sleep!
WILLIAM BLAKE, Letter to Thomas Butts, 1802
At RSaP, the validity of the scientific method is not questioned, even in its mechanistic, reductionist, and deterministic aspects, which have greatly contributed to human evolution and progress over the last three hundred years, although they have also caused some of the most pressing ecological and climatic problems of the present, due to the inability to create a holistic and systemic vision of reality. What is being questioned is the necessity of complementing that model with a competing model, derived from recent scientific discoveries and philosophical knowledge, including ethical knowledge and values.
Image 01, Newton, monotype by the English poet and artist William Blake, 1795. That image was used as the basis for Eduardo Paolozzi’s 1995 bronze sculpture (see featured image), which is located in the piazza of the British Library in London.
Reality is not just physical or material—i.e., the single vision pursed by human reason (it is this rational and materialistic vision of nature that gave birth to the modern concept of space and of place as part of space)—but also encompasses biological, social, and symbolic aspects, forming a fourfold vision, a systemic vision that cannot be reduced to any one of its individual parts or aspects. At least, this is the fourfold vision of reality and nature that I am discussing at RSaP; only if we are ready to give up the single vision inherited from modernity in favour of a more realistic and contemporary fourfold vision can we appreciate the complex and unitary character of all that exists (the complex and unitary character of nature), and recognize equal dignity and importance to any element of creation whether physical (a river, a mountain, a plain), biological (vegetal, animal, and human life), social (a people, a minority, a protected species), or symbolic (i.e., human ‘creations,’ from cities to religious or ethical beliefs, including literary pieces, algorithms, philosophical theories, architectures, songs, ideals, imagination…).[3]
Spatial concepts derived from classical physics are the concepts that eventually passed into ordinary language and thinking. Regardless we are now living in a completely different reality compared to the past, with new and complex phenomena and problems that cannot be addressed with old methods and concepts, yet we continue to rely on those outdated concepts and their associated philosophical underpinnings. We must rethink the traditional model of spatiality, including our concepts of place and space. This is basic if we aim to change our approach to the environment. I will dedicate a specific article on the difficulties to get rid of the modern presuppositions and assumption about traditional spatial language.
Here’s a fundamental question that’s often overlooked: even though exceptional intellectual figures like Aristotle, Plato, Newton, and Einstein revolutionized our understanding of spatial, material, and temporal concepts, they didn’t aim to clarify specific concepts solely for the sake of concepts or mere linguistic purposes. They were essentially interested in interpreting the phenomena of reality of their time, according to their own logic and sensibility, shaped by the knowledge and traditional concepts available to them, as well as the sociocultural context in which they lived. They employed traditional concepts and their meanings as the foundation for their theories, even if they went beyond them to propose different interpretations of reality. This passage is crucial: to propose a different interpretation of reality, they changed or revised the meaning of traditional spatial/material/temporal concepts.
From a methodological perspective, I believe we should follow the examples set by those pioneers, especially in an epoch of transition like the one we are living: our primary focus in studies and observations should be directed to the analysis of real-world phenomena, before than the conceptual tools we use to understand them. The lesson from phenomenology, particularly Husserl’s, is invaluable here: back to the things themselves, that is ‘back to the ground of life-world experience’.[4] After that, if we see that the gap between experienced reality and our explanations for it grows (problems seems irresolvable…), it may be that our traditional concepts are no longer valid to take hold of reality and need reevaluation. For me, this is the case for the concepts of space and place in the present era. Accordingly, the name for this website—rethinking space and place—signifies a research effort that goes beyond merely exploring spatial concepts; instead, it aims to examine the phenomena of reality, (specifically, at least in the beginning of my research, architectural phenomena),[5] by reinterpreting the traditional meanings of spatial concepts that underlie modern and contemporary narratives across various disciplines, as I believe these concepts, in their traditional form, are no longer adequate to grasp the systemic complexity of today’s reality, beginning with environmental phenomena.
For instance, in my area of expertise, architecture can no longer be viewed as a standalone field of knowledge, as it was previously thought and still assumed by many architects. Instead, it must be seen as an integral part of a complex web of knowledge and connections that transcend traditional disciplinary boundaries, just as processes cross boundaries in the physicochemical, biological, ecological, sociocultural, and symbolic realms to define reality as a unified, multifaceted whole that cannot be reduced to a single aspect, whether objective (things and physicochemical processes) or subjective (human thought and cultural-symbolic processes). The new spatiality model, which inevitably affects design professions, should express this new, recently acquired knowledge of reality or nature, which is characterized by its organic, systemic, probabilistic, anti-reductionist, emergent, and holistic aspects, rather than being mechanistic, deterministic, and reductionist. This new model of spatiality, which reflects a new cosmology, must transcend particular spatial practices to reach for universality. After all, my approach to spatial questions has always been transdisciplinary in this sense.
As an architect, with that title—rethinking space and place—I emphasized these concepts, even though they are intertwined with material and temporal considerations;[6] in fact, the concept of place as a system of processes that I discuss at RSaP encompasses spatial, temporal, material and immaterial dimensions of reality. As I mentioned in previous articles, the ‘placial’ or place-based thesis I am developing here—redefining spatial concepts and their connection to temporal, material and immaterial aspects to gain a more integrated understanding of nature—is not a personal idea, but rather a collective effort that began symbolically in 1905 and continues to this day.[7] The current era is questioning traditional conceptualizations and interpretations of reality based on classical physics, which often no longer match the systemic complexity of today’s world.
So, how should we look at traditional concepts or, more generally, at concepts delivered by authors from past epochs—characterized by different physical laws, and different scientific and philosophical knowledge—if we aim at the elucidation of present-day phenomena that bear little resemblance to those of previous eras? My suggested approach involves progressive or partial adaptation, which means avoiding the direct application of old concepts to new ways of thinking, and instead, combining different theories or concepts to create new, more comprehensive ones. The ‘combination’ should not be seen as a mechanical mix of different theories on the same concepts, which would result in a chaotic jumble of theories and concepts (a Frankensteinian epistemology). Instead, it should be viewed as a new, organic conceptual framework that can incorporate past theories and concepts (or parts of them), revealing new explanatory horizons. The new framework should serve as an alternative, effective method for clarifying instances of present-day reality and phenomena. For such an occurrence to happen, we should first develop a personal statement or present-day vision of reality and related phenomena, and only then mature an idea of the instruments (in this case, spatial concepts) through which to approach the new vision. Imposing outdated concepts on a new reality whether they be Aristotelian, Platonic, Newtonian, Heideggerian, or Einsteinian (with the spacetime concept being surpassed by the field concept) would, at best, result in second-hand, third-hand, or fourth-hand interpretations, or even worse, anachronistic ones, which obscure rather than clarify the original intentions and ideas of these pioneering thinkers.
To briefly illustrate the issue of spatial anachronisms and their inherent dangers, consider the following examples. It is highly questionable to translate the Aristotelian ‘topos’ as ‘space’, as many still do, without understanding Aristotle’s physical theory and recognizing that the ancient Greeks lacked a concept of ‘space’ as we know it today. Similarly, when discussing classical Greek geometry, attributing a concept of space to Euclid’s geometry, as is commonly done, is equally anachronistic: ‘In Antiquity, the subject matter of geometry was thought to be (continuous) quantities, or magnitudes, like circles, straight lines, triangles or conic sections—not space. Anyone who went through the thirteen books of Euclid’s Elements looking for a single reference to “space” or “place” would be sorely disappointed’, philosopher of science Vincenzo De Risi says, recalling an argument also dear to Einstein but often forgotten.[8] Again, from a psychological or cognitive perspective, it is highly debatable to discuss the correspondence between neural states of space (i.e., ‘mental space’) and ‘physical space’ if physical space is, per se, a ‘conceptual monstrosity’ or an ‘entity’ that has lost any physical meaning after Einstein.[9] That would mean building (spatial) theories mainly on presuppositions derived from classical physics. Before debating the existence of ‘physical space’, I believe we should first define what space is. To answer this, we must revisit the Greek sources, incorporating interdisciplinary perspectives and linguistic analysis. In my area of specialization, architecture, it’s debatable whether Vitruvius’ concept of ‘spatium’ aligns with our modern understanding of space: in the Roman world, spatium was seen as one-dimensional, two-dimensional, or temporal, with no explicit notion of it as a triple dimension—see the articles Concepts of Space in Vitruvius and Anachronistic Interpretations of Space. With a few exceptions,[10] we had to wait for Bruno and Renaissance speculations before spatium was explicitly linked to a triple extension, although initially, spatium was simply another name for place! In the original words (the Latin spatium or spacium), space was a ‘locus inane’ or a ‘locus internus’ with reference to the internal place of a body left vacant; it wasn’t until a later historical phase that ‘locus’ came to mean an infinite extent – spatium as space, in the modern sense that we all know – as the stage for bodies to move and exist—see Concepts of Place, Space, Matter, and the Nature of Physical Existence and Place and Space: A Philosophical History. Relying on anachronistic interpretations of concepts is a hindrance to human progress and understanding in any domain of human knowledge.
To return to the main argument of this article and the modalities through which a change of sense in traditional concepts happen, when Aristotle wanted to elucidate the meaning of matter or the meaning of place (topos), his approach was not to examine them in isolation, but rather to elucidate the natural phenomena of his time, which, as a consequence, required him to critically analyze and reevaluate the prevailing concepts of matter and spatiality. Specifically, regarding matter, he sought to understand the phenomenon of ‘change’—why reality changes and what happens to matter during this process.[11] He introduced the concept of ‘prime matter’ to explain this, positing that if matter doesn’t emerge from or disappear into nothing, there must be an underlying substrate that persists through change. Regarding ‘place’, Aristotle aimed to examine the fundamental aspects of reality in relation to the ‘where’ of material behaviours, specifically seeking to refute the absurd and illogical hypothesis that physical or material objects move and behave within something immaterial, i.e., the void (to kenon), that is, a nothing, as the atomists claimed. This story serves as a warning to those who believe that actual bodies exist in and move through space—these are common beliefs—as ‘space’ is not a physical substance or medium.[12] As for the metaphorical use of space, which is now a standard, it ultimately reverted against ourselves, contributing to our separation from the concrete dynamics of nature, which are place-based dynamics. Aristotle’s concept of place, with all its limitations, had a physical and practical scope: a physical theory aimed at explaining phenomena in a practical way. Throughout history, scholars have offered various interpretations of Aristotle’s ideas on matter/prime matter and place/topos. In my opinion, only interpretations that offer a more direct and intelligible understanding of present-day reality, if they exist, are worth exploring, even if they stray from traditional or integralist views of Aristotle’s philosophy.
When we move from Aristotle to Heidegger, we find that the German philosopher explored the phenomenon of spatiality, but his focus was not primarily on defining ‘place’ or ‘space’ per se: Heidegger’s primary interest laid in analyzing how the fundamental existential characteristics of reality (Being), particularly human reality (human being, or Dasein), manifested as spatial and temporal traits (we must note that, as a German speaker and writer, and as a profound knower of the Greek and Latin languages, Heidegger mostly used native terms like ‘raum’, ‘ort’, ‘ortshaft’, ‘platz’, ‘stelle’, and/or ‘chōra’, ‘topos’, ‘stadion’, ‘spatium’, ‘extensio’, etc. rather than ‘space’ and ‘place’; this introduces a level of uncertainty and potential misinterpretation by English interpreters and translators, adding to the inherent complexity of Heidegger’s subject). This fact necessarily meant that he used spatial concepts and the knowledge available to him, which were the product of a specific cultural and temporal context, historical heritage, and language. Heidegger, not being a philosopher specialized about how the new science was changing our understanding of reality in spatial terms, relied on traditional spatial concepts, which, whether we like it or not, had an undeniable physicalist bias inherited from classical physics. This led to a certain ‘physicalist bias’ in his spatial interpretation of reality, which, in my view, is a problematic aspect of Heidegger’s conception of spatiality, particularly with regard to the concept of space. This issue is especially relevant for architects and architectural interpretations based on Heidegger’s thinking (or, perhaps, more accurately for those who do not speak German, interpretations based on the interpretations/translations of Heidegger’s thinking). All in all, concerning space, in my view Heidegger was able to maintain a physicalist bias within reasonable interpretative limits, unlike many of his interpreters (particularly phenomenologically-oriented thinkers), by frequently consulting the original Greek and Latin sources for space and place, thereby correctly preserving their meanings—as seen in ‘Building Dwelling Thinking’. In contrast, interpreters and translators (one above all: O. F. Bollnow) often neglect the significant spatial connotations of ‘raum-as-room’, the Greek and Latin ‘chōra’, ‘spadion/stadion’, ‘spatium’, ‘extensio’, reducing them to a single, all-encompassing concept of (physicalist) space—an approach I dispute. Using his own logic and linguistic knowledge, Heidegger developed a distinct perspective on spatiality, independent of the new spatial (temporal and material) conceptions that emerged after Einstein and quantum mechanics, and managed to maintain a safe distance from the too narrow, physicalist understanding of space and place rooted in the outdated concepts of classical physics.
2. Confrontation of Different Conceptions of Spatiality
That being said, for me, to make the most of Aristotelian and Heideggerian spatial, material, and temporal concepts, we need to apply them in a way that clarifies reality, rather than treating such concepts as rigid abstractions. This brings us to the article’s second key point: a comparison of the spatiality vision presented at RSaP with that of classical thinkers, highlighting both main differences and continuities.
I accept certain interpretations of spatiality attempted by Aristotle and Heidegger, for instance, but rejects aspects that I see as an obstacle to our current understanding of reality, particularly those aspects that affect our understanding of nature, and, as an architect, the relationship between architecture and nature, or the nature of reality. For me, this is a way to revitalize their thinking, much like my frequent references to the spatial interpretation of reality of authors such as Archytas, Plato, Whitehead, and Einstein.
Regarding Aristotle, with respect to the spatial concepts that I propose (A] place as a system of physicochemical, biological, sociocultural and symbolic processes, and B] space as an abstract, dimensionally-based notion, i.e., an abstract extension with no actual or concrete meaning),[13] I accept his notion of place (topos) as determined by a boundary or limit (topos/place is ‘the first unchangeable limit of that which surrounds’—see Aristotle’s Concept of Place), but I expand it to include things, considering places as true things, thereby considering both ‘external’ and ‘internal’ characters inherent to place, an idea that Descartes explored before others in his Principia Philosophiae with the notions of external place, equivalent with the Aristotelian notion, and internal place coincident with corporeal substance (Principle X). For instance, when a certain number of physicochemical processes materialize through a physical structure (e.g., the structure of a crystal—see Image 02, below) we perceive its presence as a limited region with specific properties, distinct from adjacent regions. The limit enables us to identify the place of physicochemical processes as a specific thing or object. In essence, things are places—the place of reified processes. In this respect, American philosopher Edward Casey, following Heidegger’s secure path (who stated that ‘things are themselves places’, in ‘Art and Space’) talked about ‘elemental thing-place’.[14]
Image 02, Things are places—the place of reified processes. A limit or boundary reifies the place of physicochemical processes, making them appear to us as a diamond—a region with specific properties, different from (de-limited by) adjacent regions, i.e., the background. The region is a place—things are places. On the question of limits, things/processes, and places, see the article Limit Place Appearance.
Although this interpretation seems to contradict Aristotle’s traditional view that place is not a thing, as stated in Physics, IV, my interpretation of place is broad enough to reconcile the apparent dualism between concrete and abstract aspects of place: since, by definition, I argue that place also has an abstract or potential dimension (according to my definition—see What Is Place? What Is Space?—place is also the realm of symbolic and abstract processes, and, as such, it cannot have a physical boundary or limit), in this sense, it cannot be identified with a physical thing, as Aristotle argued. With an expression mediated by contemporary physics, the concept of place I am discussing is inherently structured on the principle of ‘complementarity’—that’s why it is also receptive to Aristotle’s hypothesis that place and things are distinct, and, en passant, to the Archytian belief that ‘everything is in place but place is in nothing’, which suggests that place is both concrete and abstract—a belief I also hold.[15] How can it be possible? What is the structure of place that allows it to encompass both abstract and concrete dimensions? The interpretation of place I am discussing at RSaP has an intrinsic double nature, akin to the Yin-yang combination: as place is a system of processes, on the one hand, it can be seen as an absolute, universal ‘where’ for processes that are not yet actualized, a potential realm awaiting actualization. At any rate, this realm, or place, aligns with the Aristotelian idea that place is distinct from things – specifically, physical things – and with the Archytian notion that place is in nothing, as this aspect of place I am describing is not physical or actual. This place has the potential to be the reservoir of everything that exists, which also helps explain the Archytian belief that ‘everything is in place or not without place’.[16] At the same time, this reservoir of infinite possibilities, which I have also referred to as ‘Being’ to use the Heideggerian terminology I have examined in Being as Place: Introduction to Metaphysics Part One and Part Two, is the place of processes that strive for actualization–the positive outcome of processes. Once actualized, these processes manifest as elemental things-place (the place of actualized processes). This is why we can say that things (concrete, physical things) are places, aligning with both Heidegger’s and Casey’s positions. Fundamentally, by saying—as I do—that ‘reality is place’ (the place of processes), I invite readers to consider that reality-as-place arises from the struggle between concreteness and abstraction, actuality and potentiality, being and becoming, the temporal and the a-temporal. Matter and mind or thought. This interpretation of reality as a place of processes accommodates both Parmenides’ view that reality is Being, One, and timeless, and Heraclitus’ view that reality is becoming, bringing these seemingly opposite visions, Being and becoming, the One and the Many, under the same umbrella (for more details on this question, readers are referred to the abovementioned article).
Remaining in those Greek origins, the foundation of all spatial debates, the concept of place as a system of processes, with its intrinsic dual nature, aligns with Plato’s theory of forms and spatiality, as outlined in his Dialogues; this similarity is why I have always seen a parallel between reality understood as place (the fundamental notion of spatiality I discuss at RSaP) and Plato’s understanding of reality as chōra—‘chorality’ is a property of place I listed in the article What Is Place? What Is Space?, where I presented my vision of spatial concepts. The concept of place as system encompasses both the ideal/intelligible/abstract/potential nature of reality, as well as its physical/sensible/concrete/actual nature: from the intersection of these two natures, by a sort of bastard reasoning (to say it with Plato), place-as-chōra arises as a realm that is both ideal and physical, yet neither purely ideal nor physical. In different articles at RSaP, I represented this spatial/placial complementary state of reality—this bastard nature—using the juxtaposition of two brackets: ( ). Reality as a complex system combining its parts into a greater unity, that is, emerging when ‘the many become one, and are increased by one’, Whitehead observed in Process and Reality, a concept that Ludwig von Bertalanffy scientifically interpreted in his General System Theory, a few decades later.[17]
Expressed in terms of place and space, in my view, reality initially refers to place as a concrete instance, although as we’ve seen, it can also have an abstract nature, such as the place where processes aren’t actualized; but reality also refers to space as an abstract instance, that is: place( )space—the interplay between place and space, with their distinct natures, opposite but contiguous, close the circle of reality as an environmental domain between the concrete and the abstract, being and becoming, actuality and potentiality… (at this regard, see also the article The Place of Space for further insight on the ontological and epistemological differences and contiguities between place and space).
Image 03. Place and space, as contrasting terms—concrete/abstract—necessary to reach for a complete, seamlessly place-based and space-based understanding of reality.
The main difference I see between Heidegger’s interpretation of spatiality, as particularly expressed in ‘Building Dwelling Thinking’ (1951) and ‘Art and Space’ (1969), and my own interpretation is perhaps his overly ‘physicalist’ understanding of space, which becomes especially apparent when considering his interpreters. This difference may be attributed to cultural and linguistic differences, as well as questionable interpretations/translations of the German term ‘raum’, which is often simply translated as ‘space’ without further specification, as Australian philosopher Jeff Malpas noted.[18] In my view, in certain circumstances, particularly in metaphysical explanations, ‘raum’, as used by Heidegger, is better associated with ‘room’, referring to an environmental or territorial region, (a place… or chōra), rather than ‘space’. The linguistic affinity between raum and room, in the sense of chōra-as-place, is clear (see the article Back to the Origins of Space and Place): I consider it an ‘expanse’ or ‘volumetric extent’—an extensive continuum, to use a Whiteheadian terminology, that is closely tied to the real or potential place of a thing, both ‘psychologically’ and physically, rather than to a ‘space’, which, in its modern sense, is often on the verge of the fallacy of misplaced concreteness. Notably, as we have seen, for a long time before modernity, that expanse or volumetric extent had a specific name: ‘locus’, that is, ‘place’ (see the article Place, Space, and the Philosophy of Nature). Heidegger was generally highly sensitive to linguistic questions, and specifically to linguistic questions regarding spatiality, whereas, to my knowledge, interpreters and translators were not, likely due to the need for a specific topological background or preparation.[19] Regarding my interpretation of space in relation to Heidegger’s writings (with an explicit reference to ‘Building Dwelling Thinking’),[20] I believe the notion is closely tied to and derived from the original Greek and Latin terms ‘stadion/spadion’, ‘spatium‘ and ‘extensio’, which are undoubtedly abstract concepts representing measure, distance, interval, and/or extension. Then, ‘space’ is a name that refers to the mental realm of abstract conceptions: this is the concept of distance or extension as such. Obviously, in nature, there is not a ‘distance’ or an ‘extension as such’, as a thing-present-at hand, but there are merely distances between physical objects or physical objects that are extended; among such physical objects I include places (here I join Heidegger, who argued that things are places). As Heidegger acutely observed, the simple ‘space’ as measure, distance or interval – the original Greek spadion/stadion and the Latin spatium—through abstraction eventually evolved into a more abstract extension integrating height, breadth, and depth; then, through further processes of mental abstraction, eventually gave rise to purely (three-) dimensional ‘space’ that came to define even more abstract and complex ‘spaces,’ including mathematical or geometrical space, and, later, a plethora of other (abstract) spaces, i.e., technological, economic, architectural, political etc., often misplaced for (or considered as, or part of) concrete, physical places. Overall, I accept the interpretation of reality in terms of place and space offered by Heidegger in ‘Building Dwelling Thinking’ and in ‘Art and Space’ once we are able to see a clear line of demarcation between place/room (and chōra), on the one side, and spadion/stadion, spatium, extensio, and “space”, on the other. To understand that epistemological line of demarcation is important since it leads to the rejection of all the physicalist interpretations of space (whether attempted by Heidegger in his earlier writings, by thinkers before him, or by those after him), across various domains of knowledge, including physics, phenomenology, the social sciences, architecture, and the arts. Consequently, it also compels us to reconsider the traditional concept of space alongside that of place, since the two notions are so deeply interwoven.
Regarding the concept of ‘place’, between Heidegger’s interpretation and the one I am discussing here, I see a close alignment on the following aspects: 1) a qualitative nature—A, existential and phenomenological—according to which place is the region (the ‘where’ as chōra) that offers room to Being for its existence (it allows its appearance, standing forth, and persistence) and, eventually, for manifesting as specific beings or existents (place has both physical and ideal, or potential, volumetric capacity differently from space, which, as an abstract entity, has merely ideal or abstract volumetric capacity). This implies that place can be: A1—the realm of unrealized processes, i.e., the realm of processes in general, the realm of existence as such (the realm of ‘Being’—see Being as Place: Introduction to Metaphysics Part One), which is the universal and potential realm from which all possible forms of beings or existents may emerge as actual things-places. This represents the existential or metaphysical aspect of place as the reservoir of existence. Moreover, place is also—A2—the realm of actualized processes, comprising specific ‘beings’ or ‘existents’ (as distinct from ‘Being’); the realm for which Heidegger, in ‘Art and Space’, asserts that ‘things themselves are places and do not merely belong to a place.’[21] This realm, which integrates actual and potential aspects, including phenomenological aspects (grounded on aesthetic, initially regarding feelings and eventually including reason), corresponds to my notion of ‘place as system of processes’ understood as ‘the where’ of processes actualized into four categorial existents, which synthesize the ‘fourfould vision’ encompassing all existents in nature:[22] A2.1—things, i.e., actualization of physicochemical processes, such as quarks, atoms, inorganic molecules, and more complex systems including rocks, clouds, desert, mountains, stars…; A2.2—life, i.e., actualization of biological processes, including cells, trees, bees, chimpanzees, humans; A2.3—societies, i.e., actualization of social or sociocultural processes, including couples, pack of wolves, football teams, institutions, register of architects, etc.; finally, A2.4—symbols, or thought, i.e., actualization of intellectual/symbolic—exclusively human—processes including zeros and ones, the concept of space, equations, poems, architectures, music, religious beliefs, aspirations, imagination, and all other conceivable entities. It is through this symbolic or intellectual aspect of reality-as-place, due to the exclusive agency of the human presence and creativity, that the universal, existential, and potential aspects of place—A1—can be explored, bridging the gap between (closing the circle of reality) between the actual and the potential, the limited and the unlimited, and the physical and the ideal or mental.
I want to emphasize that this concept of place, as the ultimate principle of nature—archē (ἀρχή), see the article Places Everywhere – Everything Is Place—processual, organic, and systemic, is inherently open to novelty and creation, much like nature itself. It rejects reductionisms, particularly social and political instrumental readings sometimes associated with Heidegger’s spatial thinking. This concept of place, although rooted in the idea of limit according to the Aristotelian tradition, challenges traditional ‘inward-looking’ narratives and narratives of exclusion; as a fundamental metaphysical agent structured on the category of contrast between opposing parties (see Being as Place: Introduction to Metaphysics Part Two), place integrates differences into unity—the many into the one—by continuously establishing new limits or adjusting old ones, much like a living organism.
2) Another essential aspect of place is its quantitative dimension—B, which emerges from its primary qualitative, existential, and phenomenological nature. This is the aspect that characterizes the essence of space derived from place, as when Heidegger asserts that ‘spaces receive their being from place and not from space.’[23] Space emerges as an abstract conceptualization (i.e., the Greek-Latin connotation of deriving from spadion/stadion, spatium, and extensio) from the concreteness of places/things. This connotation is the one for which we can say that space belongs to place as its measure or dimension, or that space is the dimensionality intrinsic to any place, or even that space, following its evolutionary and incrementally abstract trajectory, is the nurturer of processes that eventually give rise to more complex, still abstract, conceptions of space, such as geometrical space, technological space, economic space, architectural space, etc. which abstractly reproduce certain characteristics of real places, particularly extension, without considering the vast range of other processes that occur in any actual place. The fundamental difference between place and space enables us to distinguish between their ontological natures, with place being concrete and space being abstract, thereby reversing the traditional modern spatial narrative that originated with Newton and his interpreters, which holds that place is a part of space. Here, I join Heidegger in saying that it is the other way around: space is a ‘part’ of place. Indeed, an abstract part (i.e., an abstract conceptualization).
Notes
[1] Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, third ed. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press), 1996.
[2] Keith G. Davis, William Blake, the Single Vision and Newton’s Sleep: A History of Science, Poetry and Progress (New York: Routledge, 2024), 164.
[3] In the Paragraph 2.3 of the article The Place of Architecture The Architecture of Place – Part II: A Historical Survey, I mentioned the possibility of explaining the main aspects of the Heideggerian ‘fourfold’—das Geviert—in terms of the fourfold, systemic nature of place: place as the system of physicochemical, biological, social, and symbolic processes—the notion that I am discussing at RSaP.
[4] Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and the Transcendental Phenomenology (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), 229.
[5] Architectural phenomena, initially, and, later, environmental phenomenal in their connection with design professions.
[6] ‘Rethinking Space and Place’ was the name of the session of a conference which I participated with my paper From Space to Place: A Necessary Paradigm Shift in Architecture.
[7] In 1905, Einstein published several papers that would shape the future of physics, revealing new and unexpected insights into the fundamental laws of nature, including relativity and quantum mechanics. Einstein’s Special and General Relativity contributed to change our understanding of some the basic concepts with which we understand nature (space, time, energy, and matter, above all).
[8] Vincenzo De Risi, ‘Analysis Situs, the Foundations of Mathematics and a Geometry of Space’ in The Oxford Handbook of Leibniz, ed. M.R. Antognazza (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2019), pp. 247-58.
[9] Physicists Ernst Mach refers to the concept of absolute space—which is the concept of space that passed into ordinary language—as a ‘conceptual monstrosity’. In Max Jammer, Concepts of Space, The History of Theories of Space in Physics (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1993), 143.
[10] Edward Casey considers Epicurus’ anaphes phusis (or physis)—‘intangible substance’—one of those exceptions. See the chapter ‘The Emergence of Space’, in The Fate of Place, page 83.
[11] See the article ‘Form vs. Matter’ by Thomas Ainsworth, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
[12] We don’t need to revisit the Michelson-Morley experiment to understand that there is no ‘natural’ space, whether considered as a substance, medium, or any other entity referred to by a different name, such as absolute space, the aether, or the luminiferous aether. To those who also believe in the nominal value of ‘place’, I remind them that there are varying degrees of abstraction between words. Place and space are almost at the opposites of the gradient between concretion and abstraction: one originally referred to the concrete situation of things, as seen in Aristotle or Iamblichus’ statement that ‘place is naturally united with things in place’ (see Casey’s The Fate of Place, page 90), while the other originally referred to the measure of a distance, an abstract notion. It took ‘space’ almost two thousand years to transform from an abstract concept into a concrete entity, replacing place, with highly questionable results, such as contributing to the current problematic relationship between nature and humanity—a thesis I am exploring at RSaP. It is my contention that the difference between concepts, such as concrete and abstract concepts, is established through their historical development and the analysis of human language, rather than by the assertions of individual authors.
[13] Space—a concocted concept (a figment of the imagination or an ‘empty figment of reason, [which] pertains to the world of fable’ to say it with Kant – see John, Handyside’s Kant’s Inaugural Dissertation and Early Writings on Space, 1929, 62), i.e., a descriptive aspect of the physical reality, that is: there is no such thing as a ‘space’ where physical bodies exist and move, as space is merely a concept representing the extensivity of places, which are the real entities (in the sense of actual, physical, present-at-hand), or their extensive relations.
[14] Edward Casey, Getting Back into Place: Toward a Renewed Understanding of the Place-World (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), 216.
[15] The literal quotation, attributed to Archytas and taken from Casey’s Getting Back into Place, says: ‘it is peculiar to place that while other things are in it, place is in nothing’. E. Casey, Getting Back into Place, 14-15.
[16] ‘… all existing things are either in place or not without place’ as cited and translated by Shmuel Sambursky, The Concept of Place in Late Neoplatonism (Jerusalem: The Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, 1982), 37. Sambursky refers to Archytas as ‘Pseudo-Archytas’ given that the attribution is not certain according to the author.
[17] Alfred N. Whitehead, Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology, corrected edition, eds. David Ray Griffin and Donald W. Sherburne (New York: MacMillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1978), 21. Von Bertalanffy defined a system as ‘a complex of interacting elements’ whose emergent complexity as a whole ‘is more than the sum of its parts.’ In Ludwig von Bertalanffy. General System Theory: Essays on its Foundation and Development (New York: George Braziller, 1968), 55.
[18] see Jeff Malpas, Heidegger’s Topology: Being, Place, World (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2006), 29.
[19] A thorough study on spatiality and spatial terminology in relation to Heidegger’s writings has been attempted by the Australian Philosopher Jeff Malpas in the book Heidegger’s Topology: Being, Place, World, one of the most quoted source on the subject.
[20] Martin, Heidegger, ‘Building Dwelling Thinking’. In Basic Writings, edited by David Farrel Krell (1993); see especially page 357.
[21] Martin, Heidegger. ‘Art and Space’. In Man and World, 6(1), (1973): 6.
[22] My concept of the ‘the fourfold vision’ of nature, encompassing physicochemical, biological, social, and symbolic processes, shares some similarities with the Heideggerian fourfold (see note [3] above). In his book, William Blake, the Single Vision, and Newton’s Sleep (2024), agricultural scientist Keith G. Davies also explores the idea of a ‘fourfold vision’, inspired by William Blake’s famous 1802 poem, which I quote here:
Now I a fourfold vision see,
And a fourfold vision is given to me;
‘Tis fourfold in my supreme delight
And threefold in soft night
And twofold Always. May God us keep
From Single vision & Newtons sleep
In this poetic context, the single vision symbolizes the realm of reason, where everything in nature is objectively measured and quantified: 1 inch, 1 second, 1 kg…. This reference is reflected in the featured image of the article, inspired by the monotype ‘Newton’ by Blake (Image 01). The twofold vision encompasses the realm where perception, qualitative, and emotional associations are essential for a more complete understanding of reality or nature. The threefold vision represents the realm of the subconscious, encompassing dreams, imagination, and the source of inspiration. The fourfold vision represents the highest possible state of ecstasy and mystic experience of total fusion with nature.
In his book, Davies represents the fourfold vision through RES COGITANS, RES EXTENSA, RES PUBLICA, and IMAGINATION, which, according to the author, are the four fundamental aspects of reality needed to transcend modernity’s single vision, as seen in Newton’s exclusively materialistic and reason-guided view of nature. In Keith G Davies, William Blake, the Single Vision, and Newton’s Sleep, 173.
All these visions, mine included, share the need to surpass the old model, which is based solely on reason and a materialistic understanding of the Cosmos, by integrating or complementing reason with imagination, matter with mind or spirit, or, in my systemic and processual or organic vocabulary, physicochemical with biological, social, and symbolic dimensions, thereby achieving a more realistic and balanced understanding of the Cosmos’ dynamics.
[23] ‘Accordingly, spaces [die Räume] receive their being [ihr Wesen] from places [aus Orten] and not from “space” [dem Raum].’ I agree with Jeff Malpas’ translation in the book Heidegger’s Topology: Being, Place, World, page 254. Translations of ‘Orten’ as ‘locations’ or ‘locales’ that we find in other editions or translations of Heidegger’s essay are questionable since ‘locations’ or ‘locales’ have far more restricted senses than ‘place’; it seems to me, this is contrary to the sense of the phrase (and the thinking) elaborated by Heidegger in the essay.
Works Cited
Ainsworth, Thomas. ‘Form vs Matter’ in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/form-matter/
Casey, Edward S. Getting Back into Place: Toward a Renewed Understanding of the Place-World. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993.
—. The Fate of Place: A Philosophical History. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997.
Davis, Keith G. William Blake, the Single Vision and Newton’s Sleep: A History of Science, Poetry and Progress. New York: Routledge, 2024.
De Risi, Vincenzo. ‘Analysis Situs, the Foundations of Mathematics and a Geometry of Space’, in The Oxford Handbook of Leibniz, ed. M.R. Antognazza (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 2019.
Heidegger, Martin. ‘Building Dwelling Thinking’. In Basic Writings, edited by David Farrel Krell, 347-363. New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1993.
—. ‘Art and Space’ in Man and World, 6(1), (1973): 3–8.
Husserl, Edmund. The Crisis of European Sciences and the Transcendental Phenomenology. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970.
Jammer, Max. Concepts of Space, The History of Theories of Space in Physics. New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1993.
Handyside, John. Kant’s Inaugural Dissertation and Early Writings on Space. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1929.
Kuhn, Thomas. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. third ed. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996.
Malpas, Jeff. Heidegger’s Topology: Being, Place, World. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2006.
Sambursky, Shmuel. The Concept of Place in Late Neoplatonism. Jerusalem: The Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, 1982.
von Bertalanffy, Ludwig. General System Theory: Essays on its Foundation and Development. New York: George Braziller, 1968.
Whitehead, Alfred N. Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology, corrected edition, eds. David Ray Griffin and Donald W. Sherburne. New York: MacMillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1978.
Image Credits
Featured Image: Newton after Blake, by Eduardo Paolozzi, via Wikipedia.org
Image 01: Newton, by William Blake, via Wikipedia.org
Image 02: Diamond, via Wikipedia.org
Image 03: by Alessandro Calvi Rollino Architetto, CC, BY-NC-SA
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